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I. INTRODUCTION
When defendants find themselves in lawsuits, they naturally want to know
what they have done to aggrieve the opposing party. How has the plaintiff
been hurt? In what way? Did the defendant cause the alleged harm, and what
remedy does the plaintiff propose as a remedy?
These are natural determinants of any lawsuit from which litigants can as-
sess the relative strengths and weaknesses of their adversaries’ case. Any less-
than-clear answers to these questions deprive the defendant, especially in
criminal litigation, of the prerequisites for framing his or her defense.
The answers to these questions, however, beg yet another question that is
inextricably intertwined with the others and equally fundamental to the con-
flict: who exactly is the plaintiff? With any potential litigation, there are a
limited number of people who can bring an action. Only those whose profiles
are brightly defined by the portrait painted in the statute can rightly raise a
claim.1 Only one who has been impermissibly touched can bring an action
for battery.2 Only one negligently injured can sue in tort.3 Only the state,
wronged by extortion, embezzlement, or other criminal action, can prosecute
and deprive him of his freedom.4 Those who do not meet such profiles cannot
call the defendant into a court of law; they are disinterested at best, intermed-
dlers at worst.5 These things all seem forgone conclusions—the stuff of the
most basic justiciability concerns.6
But what if a law was written so that a defendant could never know clearly
who his adversary would be? What if the long-established rules determining
the potential adversary and how an adversary can bring an action against the
defendant were only provisionally applicable? What if the applicability of
those rules turned upon a decision made using unstated criteria? And what
if that decision could be made, not at the discretion of the courts, but at
1. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
2. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Barrett, 804 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1146 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
3. See, e.g., Rudisill v. Taxicabs of Tampa, Inc., 147 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(stating what a plaintiff must generally allege to show “actionable negligence”).
4. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012).
5. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
6. SeeWarth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (asserting that the question of standing is the
“threshold question in every federal case”).
424 Public Contract Law Journal • Vol. 43, No. 3 • Spring 2014
the discretion of another of the defendant’s adversaries? Would not some-
thing seem amiss, particularly if the plaintiff stood to receive a large recovery
for an injury not personally suffered and if his recovery would come from
damages owed to those actually injured?
Amendments to the federal False Claims Act (FCA) in 2010, which were
made as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),7 have
effectively manifested the scenario just described. The FCA, which awards
up to thirty percent of recovered funds to “whistleblowers” who provide
the government with information of fraud,8 has long been one of the most
powerful qui tam,9 or “informer,” statutes in America. By changing the stat-
ute’s long-established “public disclosure bar,” which historically led to the
dismissal of an action on jurisdictional grounds if the whistleblower was
not an original source of information already publicly disclosed, Congress
has not only transformed the nature of the FCA from an informer’s statute
into a “repeater’s statute,” but has also compromised the standing of qui tam
plaintiffs altogether.10 Indeed, the 2010 amendments raise new constitu-
tional, policy, and pragmatic issues that not only undermine the benefits
of the antifraud statute, but also reward the very behavior that the statute
was meant to discourage. The harm can be rectified, but it must be rectified
by way of a precise repeal of the offending language. Otherwise, those who
sought to strengthen the effect of the FCA will have worked only to undo it.
Part II of this Article will first explain the history behind qui tam actions
in general, particularly the FCA, and the history of the public disclosure bar.
Part II also will detail the history of the challenge regarding standing that qui
tam actions have faced and the answer promulgated by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Finally, Part II will summarize how the 2010 amendments to the
FCA changed the statute’s fundamental nature, such that the Supreme Court’s
opinion as to the status of qui tam plaintiffs bringing suit is no longer
applicable.
Part III will examine the legal problems created by the ACA’s amendment
of the FCA, including justiciability concerns, standing and advisory opinions,
separation of powers concerns, due process and equal protection concerns,
vagueness challenges, and the rule of lenity. Considering the FCA’s evolution,
Part IV will argue that the amended FCA reintroduces “citizen suits,” disal-
7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148, § 10104( j)(2), 124 Stat.
901 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18033).
8. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012). If the government “intervenes” in the suit, i.e., takes over the
prosecution of the action, the award is up to twenty-five percent. Id. § 3730(d)(1). If it does not
intervene, thereby leaving the relator to pursue the claim, the award maximum is thirty percent.
Id. § 3730(d)(2). The term “whistleblower” as used here is not to be confused with the myriad of
distinguishable non-FCA whistleblower statutes discussed infra Part V.C.
9. Qui tam is the shortened form of qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequi-
tur, which means “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).
10. See infra Part III.
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lowed by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, and po-
tentially turns qui tam plaintiffs into the beneficiaries of what amount to pri-
vate bills.
Part V will scrutinize the many practical and policy problems created by
the amended FCA: the propriety concerns that have historically plagued in-
former statutes, allowing “parasitic” plaintiffs to seek damages for which
they have provided no service; logistical complications that beset the public
disclosure bar’s application; charges of champerty and maintenance to
which the FCA is now subject; questions of parity and interstatutory con-
sistency; and the potential impact the FCA’s new problems create for other
whistleblower statutes. Part VI will recommend remedies for the aforemen-
tioned errors.
II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF QUI TAM ACTIONS
The 2010 amendments to the FCA’s public disclosure bar are set out
below in order to provide ease of reference:
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the
Government, if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in
the action or claim were publicly disclosed—
(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the
Government or its agent is a party;
(ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Fede-
ral report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or
(iii) from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is an original source of
the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an individual who
either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has volun-
tarily disclosed to the Government the information on which allegations
or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) who has knowledge that is in-
dependent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transac-
tions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to the Government
before filing an action under this section.11
The five italicized changes made to the FCA’s public disclosure bar are of
two kinds: procedural and substantive. The procedural amendments include
changing the disclosure bar from a question of subject matter jurisdiction—
which deprives a court of authority to hear the claim—into what is effectively
11. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2012), with The Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148, § 10104( j)(2), 124 Stat. 901 (emphasis added).
426 Public Contract Law Journal • Vol. 43, No. 3 • Spring 2014
an affirmative defense that must be asserted by the defendant and allowing
the government to oppose the bar’s implementation altogether.12 The sub-
stantive amendments relate to the type of information that will trigger the bar
and the way a qui tam plaintiff achieves “original source” status: (1) only fed-
eral hearings will now serve as source information; (2) the information in the
complaint must be “substantially the same” as the publicly disclosed informa-
tion; and (3) the plaintiff ’s knowledge must have been derived “independent of
and materially add[] to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions.”13
The focus of this Article is on what the two procedural changes have done
to both the nature of the FCA as a qui tam suit and to the status of the qui
tam plaintiff filing an action under it. As such, the impact of those changes
requires an understanding of the philosophy behind informer statutes as
well as their history here and abroad, especially with regard to the tensions
they have created from a constitutional perspective. This history is well-
analyzed and much-related14 and will be synopsized in the first subsection
below.
A. Anglo-American History
The raison d’être of an informer’s statute is to provide the state with in-
formation regarding fraud that it would not otherwise have.15 In England, as
early as the seventh century, the idea of rewarding informers for turning in
scofflaws was understood as a means of enhancing enforcement efforts.16 A
battery of statutes was passed with a variety of objects, all including the
qui tam mechanism.17 Earning a bounty meant providing useful information,
and though the practice was held in a poor light and considered destructive
12. Although the language is clear under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) that the court shall dis-
miss the action and not consider it as beyond its jurisdiction, some courts still treat the argument
as a jurisdictional one. E.g., United States ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Ctr., Inc., 933
F. Supp. 2d 825, 839 (E.D. Va. 2013) (holding, inter alia, that the bar remains jurisdictional because
it “is contained in a subsection entitled ‘certain actions barred’”); see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
13. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B); see 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS
§ 1.09, at 1-73, 1-74 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing the substantive changes to the public disclosure
bar).
14. See, e.g., A.G. Harmon, Bounty Hunters and Whistleblowers: Constitutional Concerns for False
Claims Actions After Passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 2 AM. U. LAB.
& EMP. L. F. 1, 3–10 (2011); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of
Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 553–608 (2000).
15. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 10 (2009).
16. See Beck, supra note 14, at 566–67. A statute of King Wihtred of Kent read, “ ‘[i]f a free-
man works during the forbidden time [between sunset on Saturday evening and sunset on Sun-
day evening], he shall forfeit his healsfang, and the man who informs against him shall have half
the fine, and [the profits arising from] the labour.’ ” Id. at 567 (citing THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST
ENGLISH KINGS 3, 27 (F.L. Attenborough ed. & trans., 1963)). “ ‘Healsfang’ was a fine to avoid
punishment.” Id. at 567 n.126 (citations omitted). Professor Beck traces qui tam actions back to
Roman times. Id. at 566.
17. Id. at 566–73.
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of communal relationships18—turning as it did upon betrayal19—the effec-
tiveness of such measures was undoubted.20
But concurrent with the use of the qui tam suits was the predictable abuse
to which they lent themselves. Whenever money is involved, profiteers will
rise to claim it. Old statutes were dragged out and employed purely for
bounty-hunting purposes; procedural obstacles were thrown up by informers
and the law was tortured by vexatious suits.21 Bounties were claimed for
things that were of no benefit to the state, frustrating the purpose of the
whole business.22 As a template for what has taken place with the American
version of the qui tam suit, reforms were proposed to bring the practice back
under control.23 Ultimately, the informer statutes were abolished in the
United Kingdom in 1951.24
In the United States, however, the qui tam action was brought over and
employed during colonial times,25 was reinvigorated during the Civil War,26
and has only grown stronger and more varied since.27 True to form, the
problems that plagued the English statutes traveled to the New World and
18. Id. at 579. Sir Edward Coke was an early critic of the statute. See Gerald Hurst, The Com-
mon Informer, CONTEMP. REV., Jan. 1, 1935, at 189–90. One of his criticisms resonates with a
modern American criticism of qui tam actions, viz., that they are unconstitutional delegations
of executive power: “[T]he King cannot commit the sword of his justice or the oil of his
mercy concerning any penal statute to any subject. . . .” See 4 EDWARD COKE ET AL., THE RE-
PORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT.: IN THIRTEEN PARTS 125 (1826); Gerald Hurst, supra, at
189–90.
19. In contrast to Coke’s view, American counterparts sought to use the power of betrayal for
the good of the government. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56 (1863), with
COKE ET AL., supra note 18, at 125. In sponsoring the qui tam legislation, Civil War-era Senator
Jacob M. Howard—the father of what came to be known as the “Lincoln Law”—stated that the
idea was to take advantage of base motives: “The effect of them is simply to hold out to a con-
federate a strong temptation to betray his coconspirator, and bring him to justice. . . . ‘[s]etting a
rogue to catch a rogue,’ which is the safest and most expeditious way I have ever discovered of
bringing rogues to justice.” CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56; see also United States v.
Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885) (stating that the power of informer statutes operates on
the “strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain”).
20. See, e.g., Strengthening the Government’s Most Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Cen-
tury: Hearing on S. 2041 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter
Hearing on S. 2041] (statement of Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
21. Beck, supra note 14, at 583–85.
22. Id. at 574; see also DOYLE, supra note 15, at 2 (quoting 4 SIR WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 356 (1903)) (“[Qui tam actions] brought with them . . . un-
intended consequences. They gave rise to a class of bounty hunters who unscrupulously ex-
ploited weaknesses in the system. ‘Old Statutes which had been forgotten were unearthed and
used as means to gratify ill-will. Litigation was stirred up simply in order that the informer
might compound [i.e., settle] for a sum of money. Threats to sue were easy means of levying
blackmail.”).
23. Beck, supra note 14, at 574–76, 587–89.
24. See Common Informers Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c.39 (Eng.).
25. DOYLE, supra note 15, at 3. For early American cases involving informer statutes, see
United States v. Simms, 5 U.S. 252 (1803), and Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110 (1814).
26. Fraudulent claims made upon the Union Army prompted enactment of the early form of
the False Claims Act (FCA). See Harmon, supra note 14, at 1; CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d
Sess. 952 (1863) (explaining the types of fraud perpetrated).
27. See DOYLE, supra note 15, at 6–8 (chronicling amendments).
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measures to address abuses were taken in 1943.28 Attorney General Frances
Biddle called for an outright abolition of the claim due to particularly egre-
gious abuses by bounty hunters who supplied no information.29
A sympathetic Congress was all but ready to oblige Biddle when the Su-
preme Court decided the highly controversial case of Marcus v. Hess.30 Jus-
tice Black opined that there was nothing in the original statute that required
an informer to give information at all, let alone a qualification as to the kind
of information given; as such, complaints to that end were to be addressed by
Congress, not the Court.31
In a move that would foreshadow the back-and-forth relationship to come
between the legislature and the judiciary, Congress addressed the Marcus de-
cision by passing the first amendments to the FCA in 1943.32 But rather than
abolish the FCA, as had been called for, Congress added what came to be
known as the “government knowledge bar” to the statute to cut back on prof-
iteers.33 From then on, the plaintiffs, or “relators” as they are called in qui tam
actions, had to disclose the evidence to the government and wait sixty days for
an intervention decision.34 In addition, no claim could be based on informa-
tion that the government already possessed.35 The relator’s share of the recov-
ery was also scaled back.36
28. See id. at 6.
29. S. REP. NO. 77-1708, at 2 (1942); H.R. REP. NO. 78-263, at 2 (1943). Biddle complained
that
plaintiffs in informers’ suits not only fail to furnish to the United States the information which
is the basis of their actions, but on the contrary, at times base the litigation on information
which has been secured by the Government in the regular course of law enforcement. Such
plaintiffs at times not only use information contained in indictments returned against the de-
fendant, but also seek to use [g]overnment files to prove their cases. Consequently, informers’
suits have become mere parasitical actions, occasionally brought only after law-enforcement
offices have investigated and prosecuted persons guilty of a violation of law and solely because
of the hope of a large reward.
S. REP. NO. 77-1708, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 78-263, at 2. The term “parasitical” has been used ever
since to refer to informer claims that seek a share of the recovery without providing information
necessary to secure it. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 2041, supra note 20, at 24.
30. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
31. Id. at 545–47 & n.9. For criticisms of Justice Black’s logic in Marcus and an analysis of
Justice Jackson’s prescient dissent regarding the crucial importance for informer’s statutes to re-
quire actual information and the possibility of collusion, see Harmon, supra note 14, at 6–10.
32. Act of December 23, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608.
33. Frederick M. Morgan Jr. & Julie Webster Popham, The Last Privateers Encounter Sloppy
Seas: Inconsistent Original-Source Jurisprudence Under the Federal False Claims Act, 24 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 163, 169 (1998).
34. The word “relator” is synonymous with “narrator” and since the early nineteenth century
has referred specifically to one who brings an action “at the relation of” the attorney general.
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 553 (2d ed. 1989). These concepts are reflected in modern prac-
tice under the FCA, lawsuits pursuant to which are uniformly styled “United States ex rel. John
Doe v. XYZ Corp.” See Morgan & Popham, supra note 33, at 185.
35. Morgan & Popham, supra note 33, at 169.
36. DOYLE, supra note 15, at 7.
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The congressional debate following Marcus also highlighted an important
philosophical difference about law enforcement and accountability when it
comes to qui tam actions. Two sides emerged:
One held that law enforcement was too important to entrust exclusively to law en-
forcement officers who, after all, ultimately were influenced by political consider-
ations. Advocates of this position viewed the Act as creating a valuable “check” on
the political process by empowering private citizens to overrule prosecutorial de-
cisions by proceeding with causes of action on behalf of the United States when
the United States, through its Department of Justice, declined to act. The oppos-
ing, and ultimately prevailing, viewpoint was that if the United States failed to
proceed, the responsible political officials would be held accountable through
the political process.37
This same tension that existed in 1943 was also part of the later 1986
amendments and was ultimately resolved in the same way.38 This Article
will discuss, infra, how the 2010 amendments broke with this conservative
philosophy, empowering the relator to the point that he or she is now, in es-
sence, a private attorney general.39
With the passage of the 1943 amendments, the public disclosure bar served
its purpose for a forty-three-year unamended stretch—but perhaps too well, as
it effectively put an end to qui tam actions altogether.40 The pendulum had
swung too far and fraud had regained a foothold in government contracts.41
In addition, controversy arose over judicial decisions excluding legitimate
claims from those that were original sources of information. For example,
in United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, the state disclosed its investigation
of Medicare fraud to the Federal Government due to a Social Security man-
date.42 The government had not known of the fraud.43 Despite this fact, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held the disclosure triggered
the bar and that there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.44 Congress
then set upon the process that has swung the pendulum back in the other di-
rection, leading to the current attenuated status of the public disclosure bar.45
B. Efforts to Narrow the Public Disclosure Bar: 1986 Amendments
The overhaul of the FCA began with the False Claims Reform Act of
1985, which barred only suits based on information that the government
37. Robert Salcido, Screening Out Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An Historical Analysis of the
Public Disclosure Jurisdictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act, 24 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 237, 243–44 (1995). The enforcement debate from 1943 is one of the first intimations of the
Article III “Take Care” clause argument against qui tam action constitutionality.
38. See id. at 256.
39. See infra Parts II.D & IV.
40. Salcido, supra note 37, at 258.
41. According to Robert Salcido, Congress acted in part to address the military contract fraud
symbolized by bills for “$100 screwdrivers.” Id.
42. 729 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir. 1984).
43. Id. at 1102 n.2.
44. Id. at 1105–07.
45. Salcido, supra note 37, at 241–42.
430 Public Contract Law Journal • Vol. 43, No. 3 • Spring 2014
or media had actually disclosed; claims could even be brought if the govern-
ment failed to act on the information in its possession.46 After a volley of
changes from the Senate Judiciary Committee, the House, and the full Sen-
ate, the bar was expanded, disallowing publicly disclosed information from a
set of enumerated sources and adding the “Original Source” language.47 Its
final form was as follows:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Gov-
ernment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from
the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the
person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an individual who
has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the al-
legations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action under this section which is based on
the information.48
The institution of the bar provided balance to a statute intended to en-
courage the reporting of fraud by private parties, while at the same time ex-
cluding recovery by profiteers who made no contribution to the case. Robert
Salcido summarized its importance for all parties:
The . . . construction of the “public disclosure” bar is of great significance to all
parties in a qui tam action. For example, if the Government does not intervene in
the action, the defendant may move to dismiss the case at the pleading stage by
proving that the relator’s action is based upon information in the public domain
and that relator is not the original source of that information. Further, even
when the Government intervenes, the defendant is interested in a broad construc-
tion of the jurisdictional bar because, by having the relator dismissed from the ac-
tion, the defendant is not obligated to pay relator’s attorney fees. . . . Similarly, the
[g]overnment is interested in a broad construction of the jurisdictional bar, when it
46. Id. at 250–51 (citing False Claims Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1562 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 6–7 (1985)).
47. Id. at 253. The Senate also removed language from its judiciary committee’s version of the
bill that provided a reward—albeit the lowest level of reward—to relators whose claims were
“solely” based on disclosed information. Id. Instead, on the sliding scale of recoveries, the lowest
reward would go to those whose claims were “primarily” based on disclosed information. Id. at
254 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 20,536 (1986)). Apparently, the urge to reward noninformant re-
lators has had a history as long as the act but was resisted in the final version of the law.
48. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2006). Salcido points out that though the 1986 public dis-
closure bar was thought to be a great change from the 1943 government knowledge bar, the two
were actually very similar:
It is broader in scope in that it covers not only information that the [g]overnment has disclosed,
as was true with the 1943 bar, but also information that private persons have disclosed. . . . [It is]
narrower in scope in that it protects original sources and “honest” relators who bring an action
based upon independent information which the [g]overnment also happened to possess but
upon which it has failed to act.
Salcido, supra note 37, at 259.
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properly applies, because if the relator is dismissed, the [g]overnment retains all of
the recovery, a significant portion of which it otherwise would have paid to the
relator. Finally, the relator is interested in a narrow construction of the jurisdic-
tional bar in order to preserve his stake in the action.49
This scheme provided a system of checks and balances upon the FCA, so
that even if one party was remiss in calling for the bar’s application, another
party—or even the court, acting sua sponte, as the pre-2010 bar was jurisdic-
tional in nature—could call for a testing of the information in the relator’s
claim.50 The bar acknowledged that
once a public disclosure has occurred, there is no need for “whistleblowers” (and
hence the broader aspect of the bar covering disclosures by even private persons).
This is true because after a public disclosure, the [g]overnment has two choices
(1) to act upon the disclosure or (2) to suffer the political consequences of failing
to act. . . .51
This point resonates with the philosophical debate that occurred in Con-
gress during the consideration of the 1946 amendments.52 At that time, two
sides contested whether it would be better to have a weaker bar—thereby
vesting more power in the relator to bring actions, supplementing govern-
ment enforcement resources, and providing a “political” check on govern-
ment inaction that might be due to collusion—or, alternatively, to have a
stronger bar, entrusting enforcement to the discretion of the government
and allowing the voters to drive them from office if they failed to do their
jobs.53 Both times, in 1946 and 1986, Congress chose the latter.54
The decision was prudent in two ways. First, it made the bar a matter of
subject matter jurisdiction; as such the court itself could enforce the bar,
weeding out informationless claims and consequently protecting the public
fisc from divestment by way of undeserved rewards.55 Second, it acknowl-
edged that politics can often factor into prosecutorial discretion.56 That is,
while the Department of Justice (DoJ) could refuse to prosecute a case of
fraud for political reasons, it could also fail to bar a relator for political rea-
sons; for example, by refusing to regain a defendant’s fraudulently obtained
funds or by sharing retained funds with a relator who had done nothing to
earn them.57 Thus, the defendant’s power to call for the public disclosure
bar’s testing of relator information was sufficient protection against potential
abuse.
Above all, the 1986 iteration of the public disclosure bar served the overall
objective of balancing, on the one hand, incentivizing suits by those who
49. Salcido, supra note 37, at 239–40 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 259.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 243–44.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 259.
55. Id. at 239.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 243–44.
432 Public Contract Law Journal • Vol. 43, No. 3 • Spring 2014
bring to the government news of fraud that it did not possess and, on the
other hand, discouraging those who would profit from this encouragement
without contributing anything to the case.58 The legislative history of the
1986 amendments underscores that encouraging news of fraud—“news” in
the sense of information not already possessed by the government—was the
force behind the FCA.59
One of the major points in the FCA’s history is the pattern of congressio-
nal reaction to judicial interpretation. After Marcus, which frustrated the no-
tion of information as a prerequisite to the FCA,60 Congress enacted the
1943 amendments, overruling Marcus by instituting the government knowl-
edge bar.61 Then, after Dean, which dismissed the suit of a state relator who
qualified as what came to be known as an “original source,”62 Congress en-
acted the 1986 amendments and overruled Dean by inserting the original
source exception.63 Finally, when the Supreme Court in Allison Engine Co.
v. United States ex rel. Sanders required proof that the defendant intended a
false record or statement to be material to the government’s decision to
pay or approve a false claim,64 Congress enacted the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act (FERA),65 overruling Allison Engine by removing several
statutory conditions to liability.66 This pattern continued up to the 2010
amendments, which resulted from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rockwell
International Corp. v. United States67 and Graham County Soil & Water Conser-
vation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson.68 An examination of the Supreme
Court’s resolution, preceding the 2010 amendments, of one of the constitu-
58. Id. at 256–57.
59. The law was meant to “deputize ready and able people who have knowledge of fraud against
the government to play an active and constructive role through their counsel to bring to justice
those contractors who overcharge the government.” 132 CONG. REC. H9388 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1986) (emphasis added) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman). Distinctions between the quality
of information in the discovery of fraud was also acknowledged: “Detecting fraud is usually very
difficult without the cooperation of individuals who are either close observers or otherwise in-
volved in the fraudulent activity.” S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986) (emphasis added).
60. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 537 (1943); see supra notes 30–31 and
accompanying text.
61. Salcido, supra note 37, at 240.
62. See United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d. 1100, 1100–01 (7th Cir. 1984).
63. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
64. 553 U.S. 662, 672–73 (2008) (holding that the conspiracy provision of the FCA requires
that it “be established that [conspirators] agreed that the false record or statement would have a
material effect on the [g]overnment’s decision to pay the false or fraudulent claim”).
65. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat.
1617.
66. Id. at 1621–23. FERA also expanded the definition of “conspiracy” under the FCA, ex-
panded liability for overpayments, removed some statute of limitations concerns, expanded anti-
retaliation provisions, and broadened the attorney general’s use of civil investigative demands.
See id.; BOESE, supra note 13, § 1.09; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (2012).
67. 549 U.S. 457 (2007).
68. 130 S. Ct. 1396 (2010). To overrule Graham County, Congress eliminated state and local
administrative reports, audits, and investigations as enumerated sources from which public dis-
closures might be made. See id. at 1400 n.1 (acknowledging the congressional measure nullifying
the Graham County holding).
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tional objections to qui tam actions is central to understanding how the
amendments have affected the FCA.
C. Pre-2010 Constitutional Challenges to the FCA
Because of the strange nature of qui tam actions—claims brought by pri-
vate third-party plaintiffs that effectuate an enforcement of federal law in
exchange for a bounty—they have historically been subject to constitutional
challenges.69 Those challenges have typically rested on three grounds: (1) the
plaintiff is not related to the suit in any personal way and therefore lacks Ar-
ticle III standing;70 (2) the plaintiff is arguably an unappointed “Officer of
the United States,” and therefore runs afoul of the Article II Appointments
Clause;71 and (3) (following from the Appointments Clause argument) the
plaintiff is a private citizen prosecuting a public action, and therefore contra-
venes the Article II “Take Care” clause.72 In 2000, the Supreme Court de-
cided Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, ad-
dressing the first of these arguments.73
In Stevens, the relator alleged that the Vermont Agency of Natural Re-
sources submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).74 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion in the case and addressed the
issue of Article III standing.75 He began by stating the requirements for
standing in an Article III court: that the plaintiff must be injured in fact,
69. For contemporary analysis of the constitutional arguments for and against qui tam stand-
ing, as well as arguments on other grounds, see James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of
the False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 701, 708–31 (1993) (dis-
cussing Article III standing); John D. Bressler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Pri-
vate Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 550–97 (1994) (discussing constitutional issues with regard
to private prosecutors); Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J.
341, 354–87 (1989) (discussing Articles II and III); Sean Hamer, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional
and Policy Issues Posed by the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 89, 93–98 (1997) (discussing general constitutional arguments); Edward A. Hartnett,
The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking
for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2251–62 (1999) (discussing standing
issues generally).
70. Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution limits the authority of the judiciary to the
decision of cases and controversies; without an injury in fact, the relator is said to lack standing,
which keeps the action from being a case or controversy. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
71. Article II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution relates to the doctrine of nondelegable du-
ties. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
72. Article II, section 3 of the U.S. Constitution requires that the president “shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Id. art. II, § 3.
73. 529 U.S. 765, 787–88 (2000). The relationship between the Stevens Court’s holding on
standing and the 2010 amendment to the FCA, whereby the latter effectively changed the nature
of the FCA and effectively negated the Stevens rationale for standing, is discussed at length in a
previous article. See Harmon, supra note 14, at 13–17.
74. The agency moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that a state and/or state agency is
not a “person” under the statute. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 770–71.
75. Id. at 787–88. For scholarship analyzing standing in the qui tam area post-Stevens, see Pa-
mela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939, 973–78 (2002); Heather
Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159 (2011); Michael E. So-
limine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2009).
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that is, he must allege that the defendant caused the injury in some “fairly
traceable” connection, and that the injury must be one that a favorable deci-
sion would be likely to redress.76 Because in FCA claims the government has
undoubtedly been injured in fact, the issue turns to the injury to the relator:
“Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against
injury to the complaining party.”77
The argument that the relator is an agent of the United States and enti-
tled to a bounty did not establish an “injury in fact” for Article III standing:
[T]he statute gives the relator himself an interest in the lawsuit, and not merely the
right to retain a fee out of the recovery. Thus, it provides that “[a] person may
bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United
States Government,” § 3730(b) (emphasis added); gives the relator “the right to
continue as a party to the action” even when the [g]overnment itself has assumed
“primary responsibility” for prosecuting it, § 3730(c)(1); entitles the relator to a
hearing before the Government’s voluntary dismissal of the suit, § 3730(c)(2)(A);
and prohibits the Government from settling the suit over the relator’s objection
without a judicial determination of “fair[ness], adequa[cy] and reasonable[ness],”
§ 3730(c)(2)(B). For the portion of the recovery retained by the relator, therefore,
some explanation of standing other than agency for the [g]overnment must be
identified.78
While Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the relator has standing
based on his interest in the potential recovery79—an argument entertained
in dicta by the Court in Marcus80—he found a sufficient argument for Ar-
ticle III standing in a rationale that consisted of two parts: the Court’s past
history of recognizing “representational” standing, possessed by “assignees”
or “subrogees” of those injured in fact and the history of qui tam actions
themselves.81
As to the latter, early British law permitted qui tam actions that “allowed
informers to obtain a portion of the penalty as a bounty for their informa-
tion, even if they had not suffered an injury themselves.”82 Moreover, qui tam
76. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 771 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
77. Id. at 771–72 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
78. Id. at 772.
79. Id. (citations omitted). The interest in the bounty was held to be merely a byproduct of
the suit, not a cognizable injury in fact. Id. at 773.
80. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545–46 (1943).
81. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773–74.
We are confirmed in this conclusion by the long tradition of qui tam actions in England and
the American Colonies. That history is particularly relevant to the constitutional standing in-
quiry since, as we have said elsewhere, Article III’s restriction of the judicial power to “Cases”
and “Controversies” is properly understood to mean “cases and controversies of the sort tra-
ditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.”
Id. at 774 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 775 (citing Statute Prohibiting the Sale of Wares After the Close of Fair, 5 Edw. III,
ch. 5 (1331) (Eng.); and generally Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. VI, ch. 39, sched.
(1951) (emphasis added) (listing informer statutes)). The Court also took note of the many
abuses of the informer statutes that plagued English law. Id. at 775–76.
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actions were prevalent in America in the era of the Constitution’s framing.83
This history, Justice Scalia said, was
well nigh conclusive with respect to the question before us here: whether qui tam
actions were “cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and re-
solved by, the judicial process.” When combined with the theoretical justification
for relator standing discussed earlier, it leaves no room for doubt that a qui tam
relator under the FCA has Article III standing.84
This history, set out at length by the court, highlighted the obvious about
such statutes—that the informer provided information to the government,
and as such received an assignment of the claim to redress the injury in
fact suffered not by him, but by the government.85 Thus, while the injury
in fact requirement is necessary for standing in every other instance,86 qui
tam actions are the exception: the injured party, the government, can assign
its claim in exchange for the information. That is the raison d’être for the qui
tam statute.87 Through this provision, the plaintiff gains standing to enforce
the claim in federal court.
Granting the Court’s logic, there must be a quid pro quo to the assign-
ment of an FCA claim—information in exchange for a bounty, which acts
as consideration for the agreement. It is not to be made for free, as the con-
tractual concept of an exchange is at the very heart of a qui tam action. In-
deed, the assignment of the claim without anything in return would present a
situation in which the government gives away a property interest to a private
citizen, essentially appropriating funds.88 The impact of this point will be re-
visited after an explanation of immediate history leading up to the 2010
amendments to the FCA.
D. The 2010 Amendments to the FCA and Their Precursors
Stability in the FCA never lasts for long. Although the 1986 amendments
had reinvigorated the bar89 and the Supreme Court resolved the issue of Ar-
ticle III standing in Stevens, Congress set about the task of amending the stat-
ute yet again in 2007. And in keeping with past patterns, congressional hear-
83. Id. at 776–77 & n.6 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 777–78 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court did not consider the ques-
tions of whether qui tam suits violate the Article II Appointments Clause or the Article III
“Take Care” Clause because the petitioner did not raise those arguments. Id. at 778 n.8. The
qui tam relator was said to sue as a “partial assignee” of the United States. Id. at 773 n.4.
85. Id. at 775–76.
86. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
87. See Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Rep. John
Conyers Jr., H. Comm. on the Judiciary 2 ( July 15, 2008) (on file with author) (noting that
“the underlying purpose of the qui tam provisions . . . is to give incentives to relators to disclose
wrongdoing of which the [g]overnment would otherwise be unaware”).
88. See Thomas R. Lee, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 543, 564 (1990)).
89. Statistics show that between 1988 and 2007, about $12.6 billion was recorded by the De-
partment of Justice (DoJ) in settlements and judgments from qui tam actions. CIVIL DIV., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_
forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf.
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ing testimony reveals that another Supreme Court decision was the impetus
behind this new effort. As Marcus prompted the 1946 amendments institut-
ing the government knowledge bar,90 as Dean prompted the 1986 amend-
ments instituting the public disclosure bar,91 and as Allison Engine prompted
FERA,92 the proposed legislative attempts of 2008 and 2009 that preceded
the 2010 amendments were in part prompted by Rockwell International Corp. v.
United States ex rel. Stone.93
The relator in Rockwell, Stone, claimed that the defendant, a nuclear
weapons plant, had submitted false claims to the government.94 The defen-
dant was required to comply with federal and state environmental laws; Stone
alleged that the defendant knew its toxic material disposal method did not
work during the time it collected government “award fees” pertaining to the
safe management of those materials.95 The Court barred Stone’s claim, hold-
ing that he had merely predicted that the disposal method would not work.96
Stone made his prediction prior to his dismissal and the discovery of the meth-
od’s failure and subsequent report in the media.97 As such, he did not have
“ ‘direct and independent’ ” knowledge that would entitle him to original
source status.98 The government’s brief even supported the relator’s original
source argument, contrary to the idea that the government’s natural interest
is in excluding a relator who has not provided news of fraud.99
Rockwell was specifically criticized in the legislative history of the House’s
False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007 and its Senate counterpart, the
False Claims Act Correction Act of 2008 (2007/08 Proposed Legislation),100
and the False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009 (2009 Proposed Legisla-
tion),101 both of which failed to pass. Rockwell was particularly censured
with regard to the Court’s refusal to recognize the relator’s original source
status despite the government’s strong support of the same.102 The propo-
90. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
93. 549 U.S. 457 (2007); see also infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
94. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 549 U.S. at 462–64.
95. Id. at 462. Defendant Rockwell moved to dismiss the action on subject matter jurisdic-
tion three years after the filing. Id. at 464. The government did not intervene in Stone’s claim
until seven years after the suit was filed. Id.
96. See id. at 475.
97. See id. at 475–76.
98. Id. at 475.
99. Brief for the Respondent at 15, 18, Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457
(2007) (No. 05-1272), 2006 WL 3381295.
100. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007, H.R. 4854, 110th Cong.; False Claims Act
Correction Act of 2008, S. 2041, 110th Cong.
101. False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009, H.R. 1788, 111th Cong.
102. H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 6–7 (2009); S. REP. NO.110-507, at 22 (2008); False Claims Act
Correction Act of 2007: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4854 Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the Internet, &
Intellectual Prop. & the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 23, 55 (2007) [hereinafter Joint Hearing on H.R. 4854] (statements of Rep. John
Conyers Jr. and Shelly Slade, Partner, Vogel, Slade, & Goldstein, LLP); Hearing on S. 2041,
supra note 20, at 3, 8.
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nents of the legislation argued that the FCA public disclosure bar was being
misconstrued by the courts, which had led to the discouragement of willing
relators and to the frustration of the government’s crackdown on fraud.103
In both the 2007/08 Proposed Legislation and the 2009 Proposed Legis-
lation, the sponsors sought to weaken disclosure requirements104 and to
eliminate the courts’ and the defendants’ power to move for the dismissal
of the action on jurisdictional grounds by placing that power solely at the
discretion of the government, to be made as a motion to dismiss.105 It was
argued that the government alone knew what was best for protecting its in-
terest and the public fisc:
Many of these cases [of too narrowly construing the bar] arose as a result of a mo-
tion by defendants because of the jurisdictional nature of the public disclosure bar.
However, the best source for determining whether a relator has provided mean-
ingful, new information to the [g]overnment is the [g]overnment itself. Only the
[g ]overnment has an interest in ensuring that its resources are not squandered on litigation
that does no more than duplicate a fraud matter already under investigation. In fact, the
incentive is strongest with the [g]overnment to ensure that monies recovered
based upon an internal [g]overnment investigation are not split or shared with
qui tam relators who file truly parasitic suits. This is especially true when the
law allows the [g]overnment to proceed against the defendant for the same dam-
ages even after a relator is dismissed. Despite this, defendants continue to raise this
jurisdictional defense in virtually all FCA cases, while searching in court filings
across the country hoping to find that one piece of information the [g]overnment
would never have found that may deny the court jurisdiction. In fact, in one case a
court declared the [g]overnment could not intervene to collect a judgment despite
the fact that a jury had awarded the judgment, all because the defendant success-
fully argued that the relator should be dismissed on public disclosure grounds.106
This claim for exclusive application of the bar was checked somewhat by
the acknowledgment that too much discretion could lead to impropriety. As
such, an argument was made to assuage such fears:
To help guard against the [g]overnment misusing the provision to dismiss cases
for political or other inappropriate reasons, the amendment requires that the
[g]overnment’s investigation or audit be open and active. The Committee antici-
pates that courts will question and look critically at the [g]overnment’s represen-
tations that it is conducting an “open” and “active” investigation and audit of the
matter. Courts should ask for factual support for the [g]overnment’s representa-
103. S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 22–23; Hearing on S. 2041, supra note 20, at 33.
104. Among the proposed changes to the public disclosure bar in both the 2007/08 and 2009
versions of the False Claims Act Correction Act were the following: (1) dismissal of an action
would occur only if “all essential elements” of the relator’s allegations were “based exclusively
on the public disclosure” of allegations or transactions from enumerated sources; (2) “public dis-
closure” was narrowly defined as only a disclosure “on the public record” or that had been “dis-
seminated broadly to the general public”; and (3) a relator would only be held to have based his
claim on a public disclosure if he derived his knowledge of “all essential elements of liability”
from the disclosure. H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 22; Joint Hearing on H.R. 4854, supra note 102,
at 14. Another substantial suggested change involved allowing federal employees to be whistle-
blowers. S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 31.
105. H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 22; S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 40.
106. S. REP. NO. 110-507, at 24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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tion. In some cases, courts may see merit in permitting such information to be
submitted under seal or pursuant to a protective order to ensure that the [g]overn-
ment investigation is not compromised.107
This, however, is only a concession related to the refusal to prosecute. No
similar concession was made regarding the refusal to seek the dismissal of
a case for political reasons. As stated in Part II.B, supra, the possibility of po-
litical collusion is real in two potential omissions: a refusal to prosecute a de-
fendant and a refusal to bar a relator.108 Congress only acknowledged the
former.
There was a plethora of opposition to the changes to the FCA for both
the 2007/08 and 2009 proposed legislation. First, the DoJ objected to the
2007/08 Proposed Legislation via letters to the respective committee chair-
men.109 In a letter to Congressman John Conyers regarding H.R. 4854,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Keith Nelson stated:
The Department strongly opposes these changes. If enacted, these changes would
severely narrow the circumstances where the bar would apply in a way that would
reward relators with no firsthand knowledge and who do not add information be-
yond what is in the public domain, as well as relators in a broad range of cases
where the government already is taking action. If these changes were implemented,
then even if there is an open Government investigation into the same matter, a re-
lator could file suit and reduce the taxpayers’ recovery even though he or she has not
contributed anything new to the Government’s case. We think this is fundamentally
at odds with the underlying purpose of the qui tam provisions, which is to give in-
centives to relators to disclose wrongdoing of which the Government would other-
wise be unaware. . . .110
The Assistant Attorney General argued that the changed standards with re-
gard to disclosure and original source would reward relators who provided
practically nothing to the prosecution of the case.111
The counterpart letter sent to Senator Patrick Leahy with regard to
S. 2041 echoes the concern that the proposed legislation was at odds with
the underlying purpose of the qui tam provision:
[I]t is our view that a relator who has no firsthand information about fraud and
brings nothing new to the suit should not be entitled to reap the rewards of a
False Claims Act suit. Second, where the government is already pursuing a matter,
the reward only harms the taxpayers by diverting up to [thirty] percent to the pri-
vate plaintiff.
We strongly object to the proposal in Section 4 because it severely narrows the
circumstances where the bar would apply in a way that would reward relators
with no firsthand knowledge and who do not add information beyond what is
107. Id. at 25.
108. See discussion supra Part II.B.
109. Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Rep. John Con-
yers, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Department of Justice’s Views on H.R. 4854, at 9
( July 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ola/views-letters/110-2/07-15-08-
hr4854-false-claims-act-correction-act.pdf.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 10.
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in the public domain, as well as relators in a broad range of cases where the gov-
ernment already is taking action.112
In both letters to the House and Senate, the DoJ suggested alternative
language that “remains faithful to the fundamental principle that taxpayer
dollars should be used to reward only those relators who supplement, not du-
plicate, the Government’s fraud enforcement efforts.”113
Other objections to the 2007/08 Proposed Legislation included claims
that the amendments would not “equal the playing field” between “small-
resource” relators and “big-resource” defendants.114 Statistics showed that
only 1.4% of FCA recoveries over the twenty-one years since the 1986 amend-
ments involved “cases handled by private counsel.”115 As such, the suggested
amendments were really only a boon for relators and their lawyers:
These amendments, which are to encourage qui tam enforcement really without
[DoJ], benefit only those qui tam plaintiffs and their lawyers, and not the U.S. tax-
payer. . . . By effectively eliminating the public disclosure and original source de-
fense, the bill will force American businesses and institutions to defend themselves
against qui tam plaintiffs who are not true whistleblowers. And it will allow indi-
viduals to use public information to take [twenty-five] percent of [g]overnment re-
coveries simply because they are the first to file a qui tam case.116
Further, by denying the defendant the ability to raise the public disclosure
bar, the 2007/08 Proposed Legislation would encourage parasitic actions,
deleteriously affecting some of the government’s best contracting partners:
nonprofits, small businesses, and universities.117
The point was also made that the defendant, not the DoJ, had the real in-
centive to investigate the relator’s claim and to challenge its value:
Defendants have the ability and the incentive to determine which of the whistle-
blowers or qui tam plaintiffs who come forward in fact have true, fresh new infor-
mation of fraud, and which ones are merely parasites or echoing information al-
ready in the public domain or already known to the Government.
It simply makes sense to allow the public disclosure provision of the statute to be
policed effectively by defendants who have the tools of discovery and other tools
available to them to determine which whistleblowers really are bringing the kind
of information forward that the Congress has said they want to reward.118
112. Hearing on S. 2041, supra note 20, at 69 (Letter of Brian A. Bencyzkowski, Principal
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.).
113. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 24 (statement of John T. Boese).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Joint Hearing on H.R. 4854, supra note 102, at 66 (statement of Peter B. Hutt Jr.).
118. Id. at 77, 121. This argument was supplemented by that of the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, who wrote that “[t]he [g]overnment has consistently demonstrated that it lacks the re-
sources and the willingness to challenge a relator’s satisfaction of the jurisdictional bar. . . .
By placing the burden solely on the [DoJ], S. 2041 places yet another burden on the limited re-
sources of the [DoJ].”Hearing on S. 2041, supra note 20, at 93 (written statement of the Chamber
of Commerce and The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform in Opposition to S. 2041 The
False Claims Act Corrections Act of 2007).
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The argument is important because it demonstrates the checks and bal-
ances that the public disclosure bar was crafted to include and the set of
incentives—not one single incentive—that the bar provides. Just as the bounty
was meant to encourage whistleblowers to come forward with news that ben-
efits the government in its recovery of funds, the public disclosure bar was
meant to encourage defendants to expose a lack of that news, which benefits
the government by preventing the wasteful distribution of recovered funds.
The Chamber of Commerce, regarding the 2007/08 Proposed Legislation,
raised a constitutional objection to the FCA on Article II grounds: the delega-
tion of prosecutorial duty ran afoul of the separation of powers doctrine.119
Since the 2007/08 Proposed Legislation effectively eviscerated the public dis-
closure bar and original source requirements, those constitutional concerns
would only be heightened.120
Finally, objections to the 2009 Proposed Legislation came from the House
Judiciary Committee Report, highlighting the merely slight benefit to taxpay-
ers, the great cost to recoveries, and the particularly troubling unearned boon
to relators and their attorneys that the bill would bring about:
The Federal Government investigates every qui tam filing and has consistently de-
clined to intervene in about [eighty percent] of the cases filed by private plaintiffs.
This selectivity is indicative of genuine discernment. Of the $21.5 billion in FCA
recoveries since 1986, only three percent was recovered in qui tam cases in which
the Department of Justice declined to intervene.
Put differently, it is suspect that the qui tam provisions in this bill will increase the
Federal Government’s ability to recover taxpayer dollars. Rather, it is possible that
these provisions will encourage private plaintiffs to file unfounded and parasitic
lawsuits that benefit no one but the plaintiffs and their attorneys.
By encouraging unfounded and parasitic qui tam suits, this bill will actually make
it harder for the [g]overnment to recover funds under the FCA. These additional
suits will add to the Justice Department’s burden and detract from its ability to
focus on meaningful cases. Simply put, the qui tam provisions in this bill may,
in fact, be counterproductive.121
The dissenting voices in both pieces of legislation won their respective
days, as each proposal was defeated. The FERA revisions to the FCA of 2009
were to follow, but they did not affect the public disclosure bar.122 But then,
after three years of attempts to bring about revisions, supporters of a weakened
bar found their chance in the tumultuous early months of 2010.
119. Hearing on S. 2041, supra note 20, at 94.
120. Id. The Chamber also reiterated another of its long-held constitutional challenges to qui
tam actions:
Qui tam enforcement also violates the Due Process Clause because the provisions authorize
representation of the United States by parties whose financial interest in the cases they pros-
ecute unavoidably conflicts with the duty of a government to seek a just and fair result.
Id. (citations omitted).
121. H.R. REP. NO. 111-97, at 28 (2009).
122. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
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Senator Chuck Grassley, the key proponent of amending the FCA to em-
power the relator since 1986, introduced S. 2964123 via a “Managers Amend-
ment” four days before the enactment of the ACA.124 The Strengthening
Program Integrity and Accountability in Health Care Act amended the pub-
lic disclosure bar to read as it does in its present form: with the jurisdictional
requirement recast as a motion to dismiss, with changed substantive lan-
guage as to the workings of the bar and the original source requirement,
and with the “government veto” over the bar.125 In the turmoil that accom-
panied the passage of ACA, little notice was given to the changes; the legis-
lative history has yet to be reported.126
Though the legislative history is nonexistent, it can be convincingly re-
constructed by means of the preceding legislative attempts. The proposals
of the three-year quest sought to weaken the bar substantively and procedur-
ally; it was effectively accomplished in the 2010 amendments to the FCA.127
The measure to give the government the exclusive power to dismiss an ac-
tion found in the earlier two attempts was simply reformulated.128 Although
the defendant in an FCA qui tam suit can still move for the relator’s dismissal
under the public disclosure bar when the relator is not the original source of
the publicly disclosed information, the government can trump this request
by exercising its “veto” over the court’s dismissal.129 In addition, since the
bar is no longer jurisdictional, the court cannot move for its application sua
sponte; the defendant must raise its objection as an affirmative defense.130
The debate of the public disclosure bar, long contested, is not finished. In
adding the government veto to the statute, the 2010 amendments effectively
transformed the nature of the FCA from a qui tam action into a private at-
torney general action or, more precisely, a citizen suit.131 With no require-
ment that the relator provide information in exchange for his bounty, the re-
123. Strengthening Program Integrity and Accountability in Health Care Act, S. 2964, 111th
Cong. § 303 (2010).
124. Richard O. Duvall & Gregory R. Hallmark, The New Public Disclosure Bar Under the False
Claims Act, Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 14, 2010, at 2.
125. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
126. Duvall & Hallmark, supra note 124, at 3; see also Peter B. Hutt II, Beware the Indefatigable
Qui Tam Plaintiffs’ Bar, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, June 2010, at 16.
One of the most unfortunate aspects of PPACA is that the changes to the public disclosure
bar were made outside the normal legislative process. There were no hearings, no explana-
tory Senate or House reports, and no significant floor statements—in short, no legislative
process at all. There was no opportunity for other stakeholders in the False Claims Act, in-
cluding the Department of Justice and the corporate and non-profit community, to suggest
improvements.
Id.
127. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2012).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 3730(b)(1), (e)(4).
130. For a discussion on the procedural problems created by the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act’s (ACA) amendments to the FCA, see infra Part III.
131. See discussion infra Part IV.
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lator is no longer a qui tam plaintiff as that term has been traditionally un-
derstood in Anglo-American jurisprudence for fourteen centuries.132 The
representational standing granted the relator by way of a claims assignment
does not exist when the relator no longer needs to provide such information
in order to receive a complimentary stake in the recovery. It cannot seriously
be argued that a qui tam statute—an informer’s statute—is not at root meant
to be a type of contract in which a claim to part of the recovery is granted as
consideration for the grant of information in return. The point is implicitly
conceded in the argument, rejected by the Supreme Court, that the relator’s
interest in the bounty he would receive in return for the information gives
him standing.133 As such, the constitutional objections to relators that, at
least in part, had been put to rest by Stevens now resurface.134
III. THE FCA AFTER THE ACA: LEGAL PROBLEMS
The statutory amendment that made the public disclosure bar only pro-
visionally applicable, at the discretion of the government, has transformed
the FCA from a true informer’s statute into a private attorney general stat-
ute.135 That is, a defendant can still go through the time and expense of dem-
onstrating to the court that the relator’s information has already been pub-
licly disclosed from one of the listed sources and that therefore the relator is
not an original source of that information, but the court cannot dismiss the
action on such grounds if the dismissal is “opposed by the Government.”136
Given this change, the relator’s action is subject to both old and new con-
cerns related to justiciability, the separation of powers, and equal protection.
A. Justiciability Problems
1. Standing
a. Theory Behind Necessity of the Doctrine
In Part II.B, supra, it was noted that the challenge to a qui tam relator’s
standing to bring an action had been put to rest by the Supreme Court in
Stevens. The problems with that doctrine have been reawakened by the 2010
amendments and are best understood in the context of the theory that supports
it in the first place.
The doctrine of standing serves three primary purposes. The first purpose
is fundamental—even commonsensical—in that by its very definition a court
132. Even those critical of the Lujan standing requirements vis-à-vis citizen suits concede as a
defensible position that “as originally understood, the Constitution permitted stranger actions
only if dollars were to change hands.” Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, “Injuries” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 176 (1992).
133. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000).
134. See supra Part II.C.
135. John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1442–43 (2005).
136. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012).
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case can only involve those who have a real stake in the dispute.137 The sec-
ond is constitutional, in that the separation of powers can only be preserved
if courts are restricted as to what cases they can hear and as to what matters
they can pronounce upon.138 The third is practical, in that the court’s main-
tenance of its role can best be achieved by controlling who comes before it.139
Standing’s practical purpose includes “serv[ing] judicial efficiency by pre-
venting a flood of lawsuits by those who have only an ideological stake in the
outcome.”140 Indeed, decisions with precedential impact are keener, more
precise, and more limited when they are made by litigants who have a per-
sonal stake in the matter:
The Supreme Court has frequently quoted its words from Baker v. Carr, that
standing requires that a plaintiff allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presen-
tation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of diffi-
cult constitutional questions.”141
Other practical considerations include “conserving the court’s political cap-
ital”142 and improving judicial decision making.
All three of these concerns are impacted by the 2010 amendments to the
FCA. Noninformant plaintiffs in FCA actions have the potential to increase
the number of court cases based on purely ideological concerns, at best
(though with more than a purely ideological benefit to the plaintiff and his
attorney); and both dull the sharpness and dim the brightness of issues before
137. Standing is “a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial
resolution of that controversy.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972).
138. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 56 (2012).
139. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The
public confidence essential to the [judiciary branch] and the vitality critical to the [legislative
branch] may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to neg-
ative the actions of the other branches.”). Justice Powell noted, “It merits noting how often and
how unequivocally the Court has expressed its antipathy to efforts to convert the Judiciary into
an open forum for the resolution of political or ideological disputes about the performance of
government.” See id. at 192–93.
140. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 56 (citing Richardson, 418 U.S. at 192 (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
141. Id. at 57 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). But see Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881,
891–92 (1983). Scalia wrote,
[I]f the purpose of standing is “to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presen-
tation of issues,” the doctrine is remarkably ill designed for its end. Often the very best adver-
saries are national organizations such as the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union
that have a keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the case, but no “concrete injury in
fact” whatever. Yet the doctrine of standing clearly excludes them, unless they can attach
themselves to some particular individual who happens to have some personal interest (how-
ever minor) at stake.
Id. (citations omitted).
142. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 56 (“Should the courts seek to expand their power
so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues, they
would become the organ of political theories. Such abuse of judicial power would properly
meet rebuke and restriction from other branches.” (quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 90–91 (1947)).
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the court because the plaintiff would have no personal, but only an ideolog-
ical, at best (mercenary, at worst), stake in the matter.143 The only one of the
three practical reasons for standing that is not impacted by the 2010 amend-
ments is the waste of political capital, but that is only because the court is
now subject to the executive’s own expense of political capital when it exer-
cises the government veto.
Standing can be seen as a means by which the court matches a “profile” to
a plaintiff. That is, if the plaintiff is not recognizable according to the profile,
he has no place before the court; the court cannot hear the case because the
plaintiff is not the right person to bring it. The outlines of that profile are
determined by the standing requirements related in the major and conten-
tious jurisprudence of the last century. Justice Scalia, pivotal in finding
standing for the qui tam plaintiff in Stevens, is equally important in the con-
sideration of standing as the author of the most important opinion on the
doctrine in recent years, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.144 His views on stand-
ing, which impacted that case, are especially resonant with the argument
made herein—that post-2010, the ACA has transformed the nature of the
FCA to such an extent that the Stevens holding no longer speaks to the
newly drawn profile of an FCA relator.
In an essay on the doctrine, Justice Scalia established his position that
“standing is a crucial and inseparable element of that principle [separation of
powers], whose disregard will inevitably produce . . . an over-judicialization of
the processes of self-governance.”145 As such, standing keeps courts within
their prescribed “undemocratic role of protecting . . . minorities against impo-
sitions of the majority” and prevents them from the further undemocratic role
of deciding how the other branches should administer their duties in service of
the majority.146 An individual has standing as a matter of right when he is the
specific object of the law’s focus; the specificity of his interest in the matter is
proportionate to the specificity of the law’s interest in him.147 In the modern
age of public interest law, unfortunately, the specificity of the traditional
standing case has not always presented itself for a court’s review. Indeed, Jus-
tice Scalia criticizes these cases because these “majoritarian” plaintiffs with
access to the political process are no more individually harmed than any
other citizen, stating, “That explains, I think, why ‘concrete injury’—an in-
jury apart from the mere breach of the social contract, so to speak, effected by
the very fact of unlawful government action—is the indispensable prerequisite
of standing.”148
143. See infra Part IV.
144. 504 U.S. 555, 555, 560 (1992).
145. Scalia, supra note 141, at 881.
146. Id. at 894.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 894–95 (discussing “the increasingly frequent administrative law cases in which
the plaintiff is complaining of an agency’s unlawful failure to impose a requirement or prohibi-
tion upon someone else” (alterations in original)).
Amended False Claims Act and the Return of the Citizen Suit 445
And while it is true that Congress can, through statute, create a new in-
jury, and thereby create a new profile, Congress cannot remove the require-
ment that there be an injury.149 However slight an injury that Congress cre-
ates, it must be suffered by a party before he can bring his case to court.
Harms must be particular, not general; they must manifest in a personal
way. Someone must be bruised and the bruise must show itself in more
than offended conscience or hurt sensibilities. As Justice Scalia says with re-
gard to an “allegedly wrongful governmental action that affects ‘all who
breathe.’ . . . There is surely no reason to believe that an alleged governmen-
tal default of such general impact would not receive fair consideration in the
normal political process.”150
This last statement resonates with the philosophical debate that occurred
in the consideration of the FCA amendments as well as with the vagueness of
a current FCA relator’s relationship to the injury of such an action.151 The
wrong in the FCA qui tam has not gone unnoticed; the plaintiff has brought
it to the government’s attention and it is now subject to the government’s
prosecutorial discretion.152 The government’s discretion to not address
said action, and other such actions, is something for which the populace can
hold the government actors accountable via the political process. In no sense
is the relator any more harmed by the alleged fraud than other citizens.153
As Justice Scalia argues in Lujan, the fact that a plaintiff cares more about
the subject of the action—is more interested in it—does not relieve him of
the requirement that he must be injured.154
b. Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
In Lujan, a set of environmental groups challenged a regulation promul-
gated by the Secretary of the Interior requiring conferral with the Secretary
for federally funded projects in the United States and on the high seas.155
The Secretary moved for their dismissal on standing grounds;156 the case,
ultimately, came before the Court for consideration.157 Justice Scalia set out
the rule for the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”:
149. The concept of “prudential standing”—that the court can grant or decline to grant
standing based on what it deems wise, as long as there is injury in fact—can be overcome by con-
gressional conferral of standing by statute. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
YALE L.J. 221, 252 (1988).
150. Scalia, supra note 141, at 896.
151. See generally Beck, supra note 14, at 543 & n.15.
152. The relator in an FCA action is required to relate his information to the government
under seal. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012).
153. Blanch, supra note 69, at 717.
154. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 557–58.
156. The Secretary won at the district court level, lost on appeal, and then lost on remand at
both the district court and appellate levels. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035,
1044 (8th Cir. 1988); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43, 44, 47–48 (D. Minn.
1987).
157. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted).
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• First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) “actual or
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ ”[;]
• Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged ac-
tion of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court”[; and]
• Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury
will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”158
The Court’s elaboration on each of these requirements will be examined,
infra, in terms of their impact on the current status of plaintiff standing in
FCA actions.
i. Injury in Fact
The centrality of the injury in fact requirement for both standing and the
separation of powers arguments is best articulated by Erwin Chemerinsky:
Requiring an injury is a key to assuring that there is an actual dispute between ad-
verse litigants and that the court is not being asked for an advisory opinion.
The judicial role in the system of separation of powers is to prevent or redress
particular injuries. Judicial resources are thought to be best saved for halting or
remedying concrete injuries. An injury is said to give the plaintiff an incentive
to vigorously litigate and present the matter to the court in the manner best
suited for judicial resolution. An injury assures that the plaintiff is not an inter-
meddler, but rather someone who truly has a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy.159
It is this role of the requirement in the justiciability issue that the Lujan
opinion elucidates. In Lujan, the plaintiffs’ injury in fact argument was the
hypothetical that extinction of overseas species could increase because the
new rule eliminated any consultation requirement for funding overseas activ-
ities, thereby impacting the plaintiff ’s chances of viewing them in the fu-
ture.160 Although the Court agreed that this was a legally cognizable inter-
est,161 that alone would not suffice for injury in fact:
[T]he party seeking review [must] be himself among the injured.[ ] To survive the
Secretary’s summary judgment motion, respondents had to submit affidavits or
other evidence showing, through specific facts, not only that listed species were
in fact being threatened by funded activities abroad, but also that one or more
of respondents’ members would thereby be directly affected apart from their spe-
cial interest in th[e] subject.162
158. Id. (citations omitted).
159. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 60.
160. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
161. According to Chemerinsky, “[n]o formula exists for determining what types of injuries
are adequate to allow a plaintiff standing to sue in federal court. The law is clear that injuries
to common law, constitutional, and statutory rights are sufficient for standing.” CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 138, at 67.
162. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Court went on to hold that the injury must come from the plaintiff ’s
specific use of the subject.163 That is, the harm alleged had to be not only
concrete, but also actual or imminent.164 Because the plaintiffs could not
show that they had made plans that were altered by the ruling, but only
that their prospective plans could be affected, there was no injury.165
Neither would express statutory authorization to sue to establish standing
in lieu of a particular injury in fact.166 Such an attempt by Congress would al-
low a generalized interest that belongs to all citizens to trump the Article III
case or controversy requirement.167
The injury in fact requirement as articulated in Lujan comports with the
Court’s prior holdings. Standing is not “an ingenious academic exercise in
the conceivable” but requires, at the summary judgment stage, a factual
showing of “perceptible harm.”168 Further, the Court has held that “[stig-
matic] injury accords a basis for standing only to those persons who are per-
sonally denied equal treatment.”169 The Court goes on to state that “[i]f the
abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable, standing would extend nationwide
to all members of the particular racial groups against which the [govern-
ment] was alleged to be discriminating.”170
Again, while interests may be created or broadened by statute, so that a
plaintiff can thereby suffer injury to them,171 that fact does not in any way
diminish that the plaintiff must himself have suffered injury.172
The core issue is this: the FCA relator, no longer required to supply any
information at all, is stripped of the representational standing found in Ste-
vens. Moreover, at the government’s decree, he need provide no information
to receive a share of the action in exchange for his underwriting it;173 there-
fore, he is not an informer nor is the FCA an informer’s statute. Thus, the
FCA relator should have to prove injury in fact just as any other plaintiff
163. Id. at 564.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 567.
166. See id. at 573.
167. Id. at 573–74. For a discussion on this prohibition of “citizen-suit” standing, see infra
Part IV.A.
168. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
169. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984).
170. Id. at 755–76 (emphasis added).
171. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (citations omitted); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968)
(finding that taxpayer does have standing to sue for infringement of the Establishment Clause
based on her tax bill); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 377–79 (1982) (finding
standing in an African-American political “tester” on the grounds that the Fair Housing Act pro-
tected him from false statements made about housing). Chemerinsky asks and answers the ques-
tion: “[c]an Congress, by statute, create a right to clean air, the violation of which is a sufficient
injury for standing purposes? The Court’s recent decision in [Lujan] indicates that such broad
authorizations for standing will not be allowed.” See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 70.
172. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
173. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the relator’s interest in the recovery
achieved standing for him. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 772–73 (2000).
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would have to do. Of course, that is one of the most significant things that he
manifestly cannot do. The injury is the government’s, or, more precisely, the
taxpayer’s. A relator without information has no more of a concrete, actual-
ized injury than any other citizen. As such, he is once again subject to the
traditional Article III standing challenge that Stevens had put to rest.174 The
FCA plaintiff with no information is not even akin to the unsuccessful, let
alone successful, public interest plaintiffs in earlier Supreme Court precedent.175
The successful plaintiffs in such cases were able to establish a concrete, actual
injury, however slight; but both the successful and the unsuccessful plaintiffs
were seeking mandamus remedies—only the enforcement of a law, not a per-
sonal gain from it.176
Under the new FCA, whether an injury is conceivable, actual, or immi-
nent does not appear to be an academic interest. An injury in fact to the re-
lator is nonexistent and made statutorily irrelevant by the 2010 amendments.
Indeed, what would an FCA defendant allege in his answer regarding the
prior public disclosure of information or the plaintiff ’s knowledge of it,
thereby triggering the bar? In fact, the court is in the peculiar position of
having to ask the DoJ whether legal precedent interpreting the bar’s appli-
cation is relevant at all, a point that introduces the separation of powers ar-
gument infra.177
ii. Causation
Although the Lujan Court does not have a holding explicitly on causation,
it makes a cursory remark about this requirement in conjunction with redres-
sability178—the finding on causation is implied from the finding on injury in
fact.179 That is, without injury in fact as a first condition to the other stand-
ing requirements, the Lujan Court could easily find that there was also no
causation. Obviously, without an injury, there is nothing for the court to re-
dress. Because the FCA plaintiff has been shown to lack an injury in fact—as
that sufferance belongs to the government—there is consequently no causal
link between that injury and anything that is not also suffered by every other
citizen in the country. Causation cannot be established by showing an injury
to third parties—here, the government.180 The lack of the first requirement
easily undoes the second and the third.
174. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 771.
175. E.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 363 (1982); Trafficante v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 205 (1972); Flast, 392 U.S. at 83.
176. See Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 371 (seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary
relief ); Flast, 392 U.S. at 85 (seeking injunctive relief ).
177. See infra Part III.B.1.
178. The Court said that because the plaintiffs did not allege a violation of law, but rather
challenged the programs that the agency established to carry out its mandate, causation and re-
dressabilty were as problematic in Lujan as they were in all challenges. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568 (1992).
179. See id. at 560–61, 563, 570–71.
180. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 509 (1975). The Supreme Court has said that
“requiring people to assert only their own injuries improves the quality of litigation and judicial
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iii. Redressability
Without injury in fact or causation, an action is not redressable by the
courts. Although the redressability facts in Lujan differ from those in a typ-
ical FCA case, the Court has reiterated that redressability of an action de-
pends upon the facts as they exist at the time the complaint is filed.181
This point has been criticized because of a paradox: because “redressability
is inherently a factual question—how likely is it that a favorable court deci-
sion will have a particular effect—[a decision about it] should not be made at
the outset of a lawsuit.”182 Redressability facts can, in certain cases, only be
alleged after discovery.183 In the FCA scenario, this criticism highlights a
disadvantage to the defendant rather than the plaintiff. While the defen-
dant’s efforts may be made moot by the government’s veto,184 it is impossi-
ble for the defendant to know what facts to utilize at the pleadings stage to
trigger the bar. Indeed, even equipped with the argument that the plaintiff is
not an informer and therefore does not enjoy Stevens standing, the defendant
still cannot gather enough facts to challenge the plaintiff ’s injury in fact, cau-
sation, or redressability until after discovery, at which time the government
may make the whole argument moot by exercising its veto.
The lack of Stevens standing for the new FCA plaintiff puts him in an
ironically poorer position vis-à-vis standing than he was before the 2010
amendments. The FCA is no longer strictly an informer’s statute; therefore,
the FCA plaintiff cannot claim Stevens standing; and because he cannot claim
Stevens standing, he must achieve it by the same means as other plaintiffs
do—by meeting the Lujan requirements of injury in fact, causation, and re-
dressability.185 But those requirements can only be met by the government
and not by the relator.186 Even in a situation where the barred FCA plaintiff
decision-making.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 84 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
114 (1976)). This point helps make another one, argued infra—that an informationless plaintiff
in an FCA action can, by being the first to file his claim, defeat the competing claim of a plaintiff
who had an actual contribution to make by way of unbarred information; this is at odds with the
whole purpose of the FCA. See infra Part V.
181. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569 n.4 (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S.
826, 830 (1989)).
182. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 79; see Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 42–43 (1976) (illustrating plaintiff ’s allegations disadvantaged by lack of pre-discovery
information).
183. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 51.
184. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(a) (2012).
185. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
186. Although the “zone of interest” standing requirement articulated in Ass’n of Data Process-
ing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp properly applies only to requests for review of agency de-
cisions under the APA, even so, the new FCA plaintiff would fail the test. See 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 107. Under the test, the plaintiff must be “within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statue.” Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., 397 U.S. at 153. The informationless FCA plaintiff stands within the statutory zone no
more than any other citizen. And while private attorneys general given standing by statute are
argued not to fall outside this requirement, since they have a statutorily created injury in fact,
they would fall outside if the statute relieved them of the need for any injury, as is the case
here. See Robert A. Anthony, Zone-Free Standing for Private Attorneys General, 7 GEO. MASON
450 Public Contract Law Journal • Vol. 43, No. 3 • Spring 2014
could conceivably show that the alleged fraud hurt him in some way—for in-
stance in the case of an FCA “kickback”187 situation—and alleged the scheme
defrauded both the government and the plaintiff ’s business, it would be ques-
tionable whether the fraud directly caused the business damages, let alone
whether it was actually the fraud that injured him or only its remote conse-
quences. As to a plaintiff who has suffered retaliation for his whistleblower ac-
tion, there is already a statutory remedy.188 Regardless, the FCA is designed to
be a statute of general application; privileging such FCA kickback plaintiffs
over other relators is suspect.
2. Advisory Opinions
As stated, supra, regarding the injury in fact requirement,189 a companion
justiciability concern to standing is the prohibition against the court writing
advisory opinions.190 The court’s voice must speak to specific matters before
it and to address a harm that has happened, not to conjectural circumstances
or hypothetical situations.191 This also provides a control for the application
of the law and keeps it from being used, however unintentionally, as a weapon
that prohibits a free society.192
New FCA opinions that contemplate the bar, however, are placed in an
unparalleled position. The court’s ruling on whether the bar should apply
is subject to the government’s veto, a de facto overruling by the executive.
The court, therefore, cannot know whether its ruling on the bar will be re-
spected or overturned by the government, which makes its role purely advi-
sory at best, unnecessary at worst.193
The gravity of this unique set of circumstances created by the ACA
amendments to the FCA is an appropriate introduction to the separation
of powers problems created by those amendments.
B. Separation of Powers Concerns
Some of these arguments have been previously laid out at length in an ear-
lier article194 but will be discussed in summary in this subsection.
L. REV. 237, 242–44 (1999). This point calls into question whether the informationless FCA
plaintiff is any kind of private attorney general at all, but rather a citizen with a suit. See infra
Part IV.
187. The ACA made a violation of the federal anti-kickback statute a false claim under the
FCA. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (Supp. IV 2011).
188. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2012).
189. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 60.
190. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975).
191. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 46.
192. See Preiser, 422 U.S. at 401.
193. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the govern-
ment veto as an affirmative defense that cannot be raised sua sponte by the court).
194. See Harmon, supra note 14, at 17–21.
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1. Judicial Review Subjected to Executive Discretion
The 2010 amendments to the public disclosure bar have removed from
the courts the decision as to whether legal precedent will apply.195 If the gov-
ernment disagrees with the court’s decision as to the bar’s applicability in a
certain situation, the government can oppose it.196 Indeed, the statute as
amended gives no guidance to when, how, or on what grounds the govern-
ment can exercise its veto.197 The government may give any reason or none
at all and as early or late in the process as it deems wise.198
Consequently, any particular DoJ official, regardless of rank, may in the-
ory oppose a decision that the bar should apply, regardless of what court ren-
ders the ruling. As the statute is written, any DoJ official, at any level, may in
theory oppose the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court barring an FCA relator.
This creates a separation of powers problem, one where Congress and the
executive have usurped the authority of the judiciary and effectively ap-
pointed the Department of Justice as a “Court Supreme” in such matters.
2. Article II Appointments Clause
The Article II Appointments Clause challenge relates to the doctrine of
nondelegable duties. Article II of the Constitution states that the president
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall ap-
point Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.199
Qui tam relators are not appointed by the president and not approved by
the Senate.200 Clarity on this issue was provided by Freytag v. Commissioner of
Revenue, challenging a statute that allowed the chief judge of the U.S. Tax
Court to appoint special trial judges.201 The petitioner argued that a special
trial judge is an “ ‘inferior Office[r]’ ” and, therefore, the Appointments
Clause required he be appointed by the president, courts of law, or heads
of departments.202
The Supreme Court held that the Appointments Clause could be violated
by both an arrogation and a diffusion of its powers:
The Appointments Clause prevents Congress from dispensing power too freely; it
limits the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint. Because it artic-
ulates a limiting principle, the Appointments Clause does not always serve the
195. See supra Part III.A.2.
196. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. U.S. CONST. art. II., § 2, cl. 2.
200. See Blanch, supra note 69, at 737–38; Caminker, supra note 69, at 374.
201. 501 U.S. 868, 872 (1991).
202. Id. at 878.
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Executive’s interests. For example, the Clause forbids Congress to grant the ap-
pointment power to inappropriate members of the Executive Branch. Neither
Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive this structural protection. “The as-
sent of the Executive to a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Consti-
tution does not shield it from judicial review.”203
The rationale regarding diffusion of powers applies to the amended FCA.
Congress has delegated to the DoJ a right to appoint informationless plain-
tiffs, without either Stevens or Lujan standing. Those appointed plaintiffs can
pursue an FCA claim and share in the benefit of recovery. Further, “Heads of
Departments” has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of Labor,204 the
Chief Justice of the Tax Court,205 and cabinet members, not “mere Bureau
head[s].”206 It is unclear whether “Heads of Departments” applies to an array
of district attorneys granted the supreme authority to decide whether years
of judicial precedent about the bar will apply or not.
Furthermore, Congress has delegated this power to the DoJ to create
standing without an intelligible principle. In Mistretta v. United States, the
Supreme Court sanctioned a limit on the delegation of congressional
power, but only up to a point.207 The Court said that delegation of legisla-
tive power is not forbidden “so long as Congress ‘shall lay down by legisla-
tive act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to
[exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform . . . .’ ”208
Worse than no intelligible standard for determining when, how, and why
the DoJ can exercise its veto over the courts, Congress has provided no stan-
dard at all. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta speaks to the current set of cir-
cumstances surrounding the FCA:
As John Locke put it almost 300 years ago, “[t]he power of the legislative being de-
rived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no
other, than what the positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws,
and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their au-
thority of making laws, and place it in other hands.” . . . Or as we have less epi-
grammatically said: “That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the Pres-
ident is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”209
Any criteria the DoJ developed in applying the veto would be legislative in
nature; therefore, it would violate the Appointments Clause.
203. Id. at 880 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 (1983)). The Court went on to
hold that a “tax court” is a “ ‘Court[ ] of Law’” in the sense contemplated by Article III. Id.
at 892.
204. Varnadore v. Sec’y of Labor, 141 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1998).
205. Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Comm’r, 930 F.2d 975, 990 (2d Cir. 1991).
206. Brooks v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 68, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); see also Surowitz v. United
States, 80 F. Supp. 716, 718–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (considering whether a war department attor-
ney prosecuting war crimes is an “inferior officer” under Article II).
207. 488 U.S. 361, 372, 411–12 (1989).
208. Id. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928)).
209. Id. at 419–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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3. Appropriation of Funds by the Executive
Funds recovered from an FCA action are to be distributed by statute, at
the DoJ’s discretion.210 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1395i creates the Federal
Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and provides for the allocation of monies re-
covered in health care fraud cases:
The Managing Trustee shall transfer to The Trust Fund, under rules similar to
the rules in section 9601 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, an amount
equal to the sum of the following: . . .
iv) Penalties and damages obtained and otherwise creditable to miscellaneous re-
ceipts of the general fund of the Treasury obtained under sections 3729
through 3733 of Title 31 (known as the False Claims Act), in cases involving
claims related to the provision of health care items and services (other than
funds awarded to a relator, for restitution or otherwise authorized by law).211
While a relator is to receive his share of the funds in a successful FCA action,
the statute was written before there was a change in the definition, i.e., at a
time when the term “relator” meant what it has always meant: one who has
received the assignment of an action, with its consequent reward, in return
for information provided to the sovereign.212
Indeed, now the FCA plaintiff does not need to be a relator at all and is
certainly not the same kind of relator under the traditional meaning in other
qui tam statutes. At the government’s discretion, the FCA plaintiff may sim-
ply be a private citizen who has provided nothing to the suit whatsoever
when judged against the public disclosure bar standard but who is given a
share of the recovery nevertheless. This amounts not only to a parasitic
claim, the historic bane of qui tam actions, but also to a misappropriation of
taxpayer money: recovery in favor of private parties designated under a scheme
known only to the executive.
4. Article II “Take Care” Clause
In Article II, the Constitution requires that the President “shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”213 Because the executive branch loses
control of the litigation when the relator files his semi-prosecutorial action,
qui tam suits have been argued to violate the Take Care Clause and adversely
affect prosecutorial discretion.214
The amended FCA’s problems related to standing and the appointments
clause, taken in conjunction with a new power to trump judicial review by
means of unstated criteria, amount to an arguable abdication of the govern-
ment’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.215 As in Freytag,
the new FCA diffuses executive power even further than its critics had his-
210. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(2)(C)(iv) (2006).
212. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
213. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
214. See Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 524–26 (5th Cir. 1999).
215. Cf. id. at 525–26.
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torically challenged.216 Now the power to prosecute the FCA action may be
in favor of one whose only stake in the suit is in the possible recovery he may
enjoy and whose only contribution to the suit is in finding an attorney to fi-
nance his action on a contingency basis.
The Lujan decision deplored one branch’s transference of another branch’s
powers:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive of-
ficers’ compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in the courts is
to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Execu-
tive’s most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”217
In a similar vein, Congress can no more transfer its own duties or that of
the judiciary to the executive branch than it can transfer duties from the ex-
ecutive branch to an individual.218
5. Due Process and Equal Protection
Due process problems exist under the current FCA, from both the plain-
tiff ’s side and the defendant’s side.219 Even if all of the other constitutional
concerns were overcome, on what grounds does the DoJ pick the winners
and losers among parties? Would not a barred plaintiff be entitled to
know why his potentially valuable claim was allowed to be dismissed when
a similarly situated plaintiff was rescued from such a fate? With no obliga-
tion to explain its standard, how would a plaintiff ever know if he were the
right kind of relator?
Similarly, how would a defendant know why his property interest must
continue in peril despite his showing that the plaintiff should be barred
when a similarly situated defendant did not have to labor under such a
risk? Valuable property interests are at stake without any discernible stan-
dard for determining the risk of their loss. This matter gives rise to a set
of policy and propriety problems.220
Finally, the lack of a discernible standard presents another fundamental
problem: how can a defendant in an FCA action know his opponent? Is he
to concede the bar, not even attempt to litigate it himself, and defend himself
against the government and the relator, with the relator’s considerable attor-
ney fees added to sum that he could lose? If he does not make that concession,
and tries to limit his losses by raising the issue of the bar, he must go to even
more expense through discovery even if the government exercises its veto.221
216. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991).
217. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
218. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419–20 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. Another due process challenge to qui tam actions is made on the grounds that the
United States’ action is prosecuted by a private party who has a stake in the recovery, creating
an impermissible conflict of interest that interferes with the fair administration of justice. See
supra note 165.
220. See infra Part V.A.
221. See Hamer, supra note 69, at 92.
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This places the defendant at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to settle-
ment negotiations:222 the defendant’s opponents are never clear and could
change at any time.
Statutes have traditionally been found unconstitutional for “vagueness”
regarding to whom the statute applies223 or to what behavior is prohib-
ited.224 Here, the defendant cannot know who his opponent may be or
how to proceed with litigation strategy because the law that has traditionally
governed the bar is now only provisionally applicable.
Another constitutional objection to the amended FCA is that the public
disclosure bar is written in such a way that a certain class of plaintiffs will
be granted a recovery in an action at the executive’s choosing. This is tanta-
mount to private legislation and runs afoul of the equal protection clause.225
That argument will be discussed in Part IV infra.226
Finally, since the FCA is quasi-prosecutorial, in that a defendant is subject
to both civil and criminal action for fraud,227 concerns arise since “penal stat-
utes should be strictly construed against the government.”228 The Rule of
Lenity calls for any ambiguity in a criminal statute to be resolved in favor
of the defendant.229 The multitude of ambiguities in the amended FCA—as
to who the plaintiff will be, how he will be determined, when and if he will
be barred, on what grounds a defendant can raise the issue, and when and
how he may do so, to name only a few—would suggest the defendant in the
new FCA action is entitled to the rule.230 This is especially crucial as the issues
are close, but the penalties, fees, and attendant consequences are great.
IV. THE FCA AFTER THE ACA: EXISTENTIAL PROBLEMS
This set of problems arises from the fact that the FCA is no longer strictly
a qui tam informer statute.231 What exactly the FCA is at this point, existen-
tially, is still an open question.
222. See id.
223. See, e.g., Toms v. Bureau of Prof ’l & Occupational Affairs, 800 A.2d 342, 349 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002).
224. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 761 (5th Cir. 2010).
225. Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1684–85 (1966).
226. See infra Part IV.
227. The FCA reads:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of
the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the
United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious,
or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the
amount provided in this title.
18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012).
228. 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59:3 (6th ed. 2001);
see Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885 (2004).
229. Price, supra note 228, at 885.
230. See Christopher M. Alexion, Note, Open the Door, Not the Floodgates: Controlling Qui Tam
Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365, 398–99 (2012).
231. See Harmon, supra note 14, at 2.
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A. The New FCA as a Citizen Suit
The argument that the FCA is now a citizen suit underscores the plethora
of overlapping constitutional problems created by the 2010 amendments.
For example, the FCA plaintiff ’s lack of an injury in fact not only creates
a justiciability problem, but also a separation of powers problem, a due pro-
cess problem, and, as shall be seen, policy and practical problems as well.
Likewise, some of the procedural problems discussed infra related to plead-
ings and discovery highlight the constitutional problems. Whether the ana-
lytical approach taken is “top-down” or “bottom-up,” the composite profile
is a picture of muddled rights, obscure rules, conflicting duties, encroaching
powers, and abdicated responsibilities.232
The kind of pure citizen-suit standing rejected in Lujan explains a set of
facts that are directly analogous to those in the amended FCA since the
plaintiff cannot claim Stevens standing as an information provider.233 At the
appellate level, the Lujan petitioners had been granted “procedural standing”
by way of an Endangered Species Act provision.234 That provision authorized
a “citizen suit” to any person who “‘may commence a civil suit on his own be-
half (A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of
any provision of this chapter.’”235
The Supreme Court marveled at the Court of Appeals holding because
the plaintiffs were not seeking to enforce a procedural requirement that
would impact their concrete interest if disregarded, were not members of a
mass tort action, and were not the beneficiaries of a congressionally created con-
crete private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party “for the
government’s benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff.”236
The last-stated standing argument would be the qui tam situation—
dependent upon the suit being for the government’s benefit; in the amended
FCA, there is neither a concrete private interest—as it applies generally to
all citizens—nor any benefit to the government in allowing the participation
of a plaintiff who cannot pass the public disclosure bar.237 The Lujan court
went on to reject the court of appeals’ allowance of standing based on a cit-
izen suit:
[T]he court held that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congres-
sional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental
“right” to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law. We reject
this view.
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available griev-
ance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in
232. See id.
233. See id. at 12–17; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–74 (1992).
234. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 573.
237. See Harmon, supra note 14, at 14, 16.
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proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more
directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not
state an Article III case or controversy.238
This pronouncement speaks both to what the amended FCA action is not, an
informer’s statute, and to what it has become, a citizen suit. Even a statuto-
rily prescribed right to create a citizen suit cannot get around the Lujan re-
quirements for injury in fact:
Lujan forecloses “pure” citizen suits. In these suits, a stranger with an ideological
or law-enforcement interest initiates a proceeding against the government, seeking
to require an agency to undertake action of the sort required by law. Many envi-
ronmental statutes now allow such actions, and plaintiffs have brought many suits
of this kind. Under Lujan, these suits are unacceptable. Congress must at a min-
imum “identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of
persons entitled to bring suit.” If Congress has simply given standing to citizens,
this requirement has not been met. The plaintiff must point to a concrete injury,
not merely to a congressional grant of standing.239
The new FCA plaintiff cannot manifestly show a concrete injury that is not
also shared by every other citizen, nor can he seek a relief that directly and
tangibly benefits him in any way more than it does the public at large. Fi-
nally, another problem exists: a pure citizen suit in its typical form seeks
mandamus action to enforce a rule; a citizen suit in an FCA action seeks a
bounty, which makes the case against standing all the more pronounced.
B. The New FCA Creates Private Bills
Another argument against the new FCA is that the public disclosure bar
now creates a mechanism for creating private legislation in contravention of
customary procedures. The government veto in the new public disclosure
bar provides no guidelines as to who the beneficiary of the government’s lar-
gesse is to be, nor the grounds for granting that largesse. The veto is open-
ended, not only allowing the executive to create standing where it will, on
any terms that it deems just (or on no terms at all), but also allowing the ex-
ecutive to finish “writing” the legislation—in effect filling in the name of the
party in whose benefit it will oppose the court’s decision about the bar.240
Hence, the beneficiary is the subject of a private bill.241
But private bills are anomalies, an exception to the norm that laws should
apply to all equally.242 In modern times,243 there are of two types of accept-
able private bills:
238. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 (citations omitted).
239. Sunstein, supra note 132, at 226; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 66–67.
240. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
241. See Private Bills in Congress, supra note 225, at 1684 (noting that private bills do not apply
generally to the public but rather specifically to an individual or group).
242. Id.
243. Due to the inherent potential for scandal in the areas of private legislation, Congress has
narrowed the subjects that they can address and has created administrative agency functions to
deal with areas that in the past would have called for private legislation. See Matthew Mantel,
Private Bills and Private Laws, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 87, 91–93 (2007).
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(1) those dealing with claims against the United States, including waiver of claims
by the [g]overnment against individuals; and (2) those excepting individuals from
certain immigration and naturalization requirements. Bills dealing with relations
between private persons, formerly enacted on occasion, are no longer passed. . . .
Indeed, if Congress were to pass such a private law today it probably would be un-
constitutional as a denial of equal protection, and might well be a bill of attainder
against the individual suffering detriment under it.244
The constitutional problems created by the bar—due process and equal
protection—are met with a third issue in the private bill context, separation
of powers: “In dealing with private bills, Congress acts much like a court; it is
not only making law, but is in effect applying it to individual cases. More
specifically, it resembles an ancient court of equity: private legislation may
be said without distortion to represent an exercise of congressional
‘conscience.’ ”245
In short, the open-ended nature of the government veto, allowing for
“floating status” plaintiffs, has in itself created a knot of constitutional prob-
lems. The private nature of the power allows the creation of individual-
specific benefits, appropriated by the executive, that at the very least flouts
the process for writing private laws.
V. THE FCA AFTER THE ACA: POLICY, ETHICAL,
AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
In addition to the legal and existential problems discussed above, the
amended FCA creates, and in many ways reawakens, problems from policy,
ethics, and practical standpoints.
A. Policy Problems
An obvious policy problem is that, without a functioning public disclosure
bar, parasitic claims become more likely—a problem that has always plagued
qui tam actions and was the reason for the bar’s institution in the first
place.246 The whole purpose of the qui tam action was to encourage private
citizens to come forward with information of fraud that the government did
not have.247 Their usefulness was rewarded with a partial assignment of the
claim and its attendant bounty.248 But now, for the first time in the history of
informer statutes, the FCA has remarkably institutionalized the very abuse
that it previously prevented. Under the new public disclosure bar, the relator
does not necessarily need to provide information in exchange for the
244. Private Bills in Congress, supra note 225, at 1684–85 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
245. Id. at 1686 (citing 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 48–50, 55–61
(4th ed. 1918)).
246. See supra Part II.A.
247. See, e.g., Daniel C. Lumm, The 2009 “Clarifications” to the False Claims Act of 1863: The
All-Purpose Antifraud Statute with the Fun Qui Tam Twist, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 527, 528–29
(2010).
248. Id.
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bounty.249 He needs only to win the approval of the district attorney.250 This
creates a policy that rewards a plaintiff without commensurate service and
discourages those true informers who either were not fast enough under
the first-to-file bar251 or were not fortunate enough to curry the favor of the
district attorney.
In addition, as previously discussed, the veto creates a distinct disadvan-
tage for the defendant in settlement negotiations.252 Never sure whether
his opponent will be the government or the government and the relator,
he cannot gauge his expenses or predict whether his costs incurred in litigat-
ing the bar will be sunk in the event the government exercises the veto. If he
does litigate the bar, and even if he is successful, he will have to pay the con-
siderable fees owed to the plaintiff ’s attorney in the event the bar is trumped
by the veto and his own considerable litigation expenses.253 The defendant is
in a losing position from the start, unsure whether to settle now or settle
later, and unable to calculate his costs to make that determination. In fact,
the plaintiff and government are incentivized to encourage the defendant’s
litigation of the bar, since it will only drive up the defendant’s costs, making
him more vulnerable at settlement. Meanwhile, the plaintiff and the govern-
ment are guaranteed the winning hand.
B. Ethical Problems
In addition to the negative policy effects, the government veto has intro-
duced circumstances that give rise to a new array of troublesome possibili-
ties.254 One stems from the aforesaid fact that the relator’s qui tam action
is in practically every case financed by his attorney; FCA actions are almost
always argued on a contingency basis.255 But that means that the greatest in-
centive to try the FCA cases comes from the relator’s attorney.256 With bil-
lions of dollars recovered over the past few years,257 the incentive to repre-
sent such lucrative cases is multiplied exponentially.
249. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2012) (explaining that the plaintiff will receive an award “de-
pending on the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the
action”).
250. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (allowing the person bringing the action or settling the claim to
receive an award even if the government does not proceed with its action).
251. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (“When a person brings an action under this subsection, no per-
son other than the [g]overnment may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts un-
derlying the pending action.”).
252. With judgment comes a $5000–$10,000 penalty per violation, plus treble damages.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). When attorney fees and program exclusion are included, settlement is
often the defendant’s best choice. That would be even more likely if the risk of the government
veto is figured into the calculations.
253. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
254. Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians: Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation Under the
Civil False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 813, 843 (2012).
255. Id. at 842–43, 851.
256. Id.
257. Over $11.8 billion in DoJ settlements and judgments have been recorded since 2010.
CIVIL DIV., supra note 89.
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The ethical problem of attorney-driven lawsuits created here is analogous
to the history of class action lawsuits.258 Just as one of the chief arguments of
the FCA amendments’ proponents has been that the private sector serves to
supplement the limited reserves of the government by rooting out fraud, so
too have class action attorneys argued that the large share of the recoveries
they receive compared to that actually paid to the plaintiff is because their
role is to “police” big business: “As the theory goes, what matters is that
class action lawyers will punish and deter corporate misconduct.”259 The at-
torneys argue that they are like private attorneys general in this respect, fill-
ing an enforcement gap.260 But the opposite argument highlights the age-old
problem of the relator and his attorney in qui tam “parasitic” actions:
The principal problem with this contention is that, in most cases, class action law-
yers do not fill any such enforcement gap. Empirical data show that, far from fill-
ing gaps, class action lawyers predominantly file “copycat” or “coattail” lawsuits
that follow on the heels of government investigations. A “recurring pattern is evi-
dent under which the private attorney general simply piggybacks on the efforts of
public agencies—such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
[Federal Trade Commission (FTC)], and the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice—in order to reap the gains from the investigative work undertaken
by these agencies.” The result is that the “filing of the public agency’s action serves
as the starting gun for a race between private attorneys, all seeking to claim the
prize of lucrative class action settlements, which public law enforcement has gra-
tuitously presented them.”261
There is no reason to defer action, since the FCA case has the wrong incen-
tive:262 the government can exercise the bar and put resources elsewhere,
gaining a recovery that the plaintiff and his attorney are motivated to drive
higher.263
The FCA government veto also raises the possibility of political collusion.
The appearance of impropriety—of granting favors on partisan grounds—is
rife when there is no check on the exercise of discretion. A recent use of the
258. Cf. Elameto, supra note 254, at 845 (analogizing FCA litigation with private securities
class actions).
259. Beisner et al., supra note 135, at 1451. Ironically, this article praises the FCA for curtail-
ing parasitic actions through the public disclosure bar:
When it appeared, for example, that “coattail” qui tam lawsuits were enriching relators with-
out furthering the False Claims Act’s intended purposes, Congress specifically amended the
statute to prohibit lawsuits based on information the federal government already possessed
and also to reduce the “bounty” a relator could obtain.
Id. at 1458–59.
260. The article goes on to make the point that even if there was an analogy between the
plaintiff ’s attorney and law enforcement, the “massive financial incentives for attorneys bringing
class actions” destroy any comparison: “[I[f class actions are law enforcement mechanisms, the
counsel who bring them should be paid like law enforcers . . . not . . . sharing the fruits of what-
ever recovery they obtain.” Id. at 1443.
261. Id. at 1453 (citations omitted).
262. Id. at 1454.
263. See Elameto, supra note 254, at 824, 842–43.
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FCA in an alleged kickback scheme illustrates the real danger.264 In a joint
staff report of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, the details of
an alleged quid pro quo arrangement were laid out between Labor Secretary
nominee and DoJ Civil Division Head Thomas Perez and the City of
St. Paul.265 According to the report, Perez agreed not to intervene in a whis-
tleblower action against the City of St. Paul, which charged that tens of mil-
lions of dollars were wrongfully paid in community development and stimu-
lus funds, in exchange for St. Paul’s withdrawing a suit slated to be heard by
the U.S. Supreme Court involving the theory of disparate impact.266 The re-
versal in the support of the whistleblower’s FCA action was also said to be
the subject of a departmental cover-up.267 Considering the lack of any stan-
dards for implementing the government veto, the potential for political in-
fluence is heightened.268
Another ethical dilemma involved in the amended FCA is that of cham-
perty and maintenance. The terms are old charges for stirring up litigation.269
“Maintenance” is generally the encouragement of litigation by a stranger to
the action in order to keep it going.270 “Champerty” is when an individual in-
vests in a lawsuit to receive a share of the recovery.271 An associated term,
“barratry,” is the professional maintenance of scurrilous actions.272 The abuses
were means of keeping alive actions in hopes of driving a defendant into sub-
mission by resisting settlement,273 among other things.274 These charges were
initially brought against contingency fee practices, and ten states have laws
against inciting groundless proceedings.275
Reformation occurred during the Civil Rights era after some states used
the legislation barring champerty and maintenance to combat pubic interest
suits contesting the enforcement of integration.276 The charges rose again in
264. See STAFFS OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, S. COMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, & H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 113TH CONG., DOJ’S QUID PRO QUO WITH ST. PAUL:
HOW ASSISTANT ATT’Y GEN. THOMAS PEREZ MANIPULATED JUSTICE AND IGNORED THE RULE OF
LAW 1–4 (Comm. Print 2013) ( Joint Staff Report).
265. Id. at 7.
266. Id. at 7–8.
267. Id. at 44.
268. See id. at 1–4. Model Rule 7.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is also im-
plicated: “A lawyer or law firm shall not accept a government legal engagement . . . if the lawyer
or law firm makes a political contribution or solicits political contributions for the purpose of
obtaining or being considered for that type of legal engagement or appointment.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.6; cf. Beisner et al., supra note 135, at 1469 (discussing the prob-
lem in the class action attorney context).
269. Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1546 (1996).
270. Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?,
30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 485 (1992).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 487.
274. See Dobner, supra note 269, at 1549.
275. Martin, supra note 270, at 488–90
276. Id. at 491; see also Scalia, supra note 141, at 893 (referencing the “narrowing . . . [of ] laws
against champerty and maintenance” as partly responsible for the rise of public interest law firms).
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the area of class action and patent litigation when syndicated lawsuits became
common.277 Arguments about the ethics of financing litigation for resource-
challenged plaintiffs entered the fray.278 Creative means of litigation risk
maintenance, such as “Gallagher Covenants” and “Mary Carter Agreements,”
in which a potentially liable party guarantees the covenantee/plaintiff a certain
amount of recovery as long as he proceeds against a co-defendant first, have
also met with charges of champerty and maintenance.279 Two primary argu-
ments against such arrangements are (a) the likelihood that some will finance
litigation only to harass defendants and jeopardize their finances and (b) the
fact that investors/financiers, who are “less adverse to risk than a typical plain-
tiff, will discourage settlements in favor of engaging in trials.”280
With the amount of recoveries in FCA suits totaling in the billions and
with the contingency fee arrangement at the heart of FCA actions, the
amendments to the FCA have created the potential for yet another employ-
ment of these dusty legal doctrines.
C. Practical Problems
The amended FCA also presents a set of practical problems related to the
procedure, parity, and statutory consistency and coherence.
First, because the 2010 amendments changed the bar from a jurisdictional
consideration281 to a simple motion to dismiss,282 the defendant is put at a
procedural disadvantage in addition to his negotiation disadvantage. Unless
the defendant raises the issue of the public disclosure bar as an affirmative
defense in the pleadings, or at least reserves the right to raise additional af-
firmative defenses as need be, he will have waived the right to do so.283 But as
admitted in a DoJ letter about the 2007/08 Proposed Legislation, the gov-
277. See Dobner, supra note 269, at 1529.
278. Martin, supra note 270, at 493.
279. Id. at 494–95.
280. Id. at 509–10.
281. The spectrum of statutes that can disqualify plaintiffs on jurisdictional grounds has in-
cluded the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012), and the Contract Dis-
putes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–09 (2006). In these actions, the government is the defen-
dant, not the plaintiff or party in whose behalf the suit is brought, as is the case with the FCA.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346; 41 U.S.C. § 7104(b). However, whereas the FTCA can deny the plaintiff
grounds to sue based on the fact that the issue is a policy matter, decisions about which are dis-
cretionary (and about which the government does not waive its sovereign immunity), the CDA
and the FCA had always denied the plaintiff grounds to sue either because his claim was not cer-
tified correctly, in the case of the CDA, or because he did not provide information not already
disclosed, in the case of the FCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346; 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b). Of the three, only
the FTCA still bars the plaintiff on jurisdictional grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346. Both the CDA
and the FCA are now only subject to dismissal grounds, after assertion of an affirmative defense.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2); 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b).
282. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
283. Jeremy Friedman et al., Revisiting the Public Disclosure Bar & Its Original Source Exception,
43 FALSE CL. ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. 113, 116 (2006) (“It is important to address at the outset
whether a particular alleged disclosure in fact even occurred in one of the enumerated fora, as
not every public disclosure triggers the bar, and failure to raise this argument can waive it.”).
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ernment would need sufficient time to gather facts related to the bar.284 If so,
then the defendant would certainly need as much time or more. He would
not have the facts relating to the bar at the outset of the case, nor could
he ethically plead facts he does not have under the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.285
In addition, as there is no guidance as to when the government must ex-
ercise its veto, or as to what form that right must take, the defendant would
obviously be disadvantaged by delay. Conversely, the government and the
plaintiff would benefit from such a deferral and could exploit that disadvan-
tage. The relator has a statutory right to a hearing on the government’s mo-
tion to dismiss his claim,286 but the defendant has no such right to hear why
the plaintiff was not dismissed,287 even though precedent, or even the court
at issue, has determined that he should be. The efficiency of the judicial sys-
tem is also at the mercy of the government’s exercise of its veto; the long
process in trying the bar takes up the court’s time and consideration, poten-
tially all for naught.
Statutory consistency and coherence are also adversely affected by the
2010 amendments to the FCA. The statute currently includes a sliding
scale of reward amounts, based upon how much the relator’s information
contributed to the recovery.288 It gives the least amount to one whose infor-
mation is primarily based on information already publicly disclosed:289
Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures
of specific information (other than information provided by the person bringing
the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or adminis-
284. The DoJ wrote the following:
[W]ith respect to the [g]overnment seeking the dismissal of a relator on public disclosure
grounds, we think it is important that the [g]overnment be given adequate time to file such
a motion, and recommend that the proposed legislation expressly provide for such a motion
to be filed “on or before service of a complaint on the defendant pursuant to Section 3730(h),
or thereafter for good cause shown.” This change is particularly important if the current lan-
guage of the proposed legislation is enacted, since it may require substantial investigation, in-
cluding discovery of the relator to determine where the relator derived his or her knowledge.
Letter from Keith B. Nelson, supra note 109, at 9.
285. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.3, 8.4.
286. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A); see United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece
Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff had a right to judicial
review of a motion to dismiss his claim). But see Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (disagreeing with holding in Sequoia).
287. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (only stating that the court must provide the relator with
an opportunity for a hearing on the government’s motion to dismiss without the mention of any
similar right of the defendant).
288. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (“[S]uch person shall . . . receive at least [fifteen] percent but not
more than [twenty-five] percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depend-
ing upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the
action.”).
289. One version of the 1986 amendments actually rewarded those whose information was
solely based on publicly disclosed information. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 29, 42–43 (1986). The pro-
vision was changed to require at least some information. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1); see 132 CONG.
REC. 28,580 (1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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trative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Of-
fice report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the court may
award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more than [ten] per-
cent of the proceeds, taking into account the significance of the information and
the role of the person bringing the action in advancing the case to litigation.290
A line of cases has interpreted this provision, including cases in which the
relator whose claims were subject to dismissal wanted the higher awards be-
cause the government took over the action prior to dismissal. In United States
ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., such a relator contested the ten
percent award, but the government prevailed:
[T]he relators’ position produces results that we do not think that Congress in-
tended. First, this interpretation provides a potentially huge windfall—[fifteen
to twenty-five percent] of the total recovery—for most relators whose claims
would have been dismissed under section 3730(e)(4) if the government had not in-
tervened. It is hard to see why Congress might have wanted the fortuity of govern-
ment intervention to make such a difference—or why Congress might have wanted
to provide such a large reward to such a relator, who provides little if any public
service.291
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit went on to say that Con-
gress could not have meant for those who were entitled to the highest award,
in that they provided a “substantial public service,” to receive the same
amount as those who contributed the least.292 Such an interpretation would
make the scale meaningless.293
Obviously, the common sense of these opinions has been turned on its
head with the 2010 amendments to the public disclosure bar.294 Now, a re-
lator who contributes absolutely nothing of “substantial public service” to
the claim may receive any amount of reward—as much as a relator in a
290. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
291. United States ex rel. Merena v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 205 F.3d 97, 105 (3d Cir.
2000) (interpreting statute and agreeing with the government “that a relator who asserts a
claim that is subject to dismissal” is not entitled to any award even if the government intervenes).
292. See id.
293. See id. The lower court in Merena was of the opinion that “[i]f a qui tam relator . . . was
found by the court to have contributed nothing of value, a zero award would appear to be ap-
propriate.” United States ex rel. Merena v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352, 362
(E.D. Pa. 2000). See alsoUnited States ex rel. Eitel v. Reagan, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159 (D. Ariz.
1998) (“If the United States proceeds with the action then the award to the relator is less because
the government’s effort and expense is greater and the relator’s contribution is less, and when a
case is based primarily on publicly disclosed information the relator’s contribution is even less
significant, and the available award reflects that[.]”); Alderson v. United States, 718 F. Supp.
2d 1186, 1190–91 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“As stated by the Ninth Circuit: ‘the extent of the recovery
is tied to the importance of the relator’s participation in the action and the relevance of the in-
formation brought forward.’ ” (quoting United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d
953, 964 (9th Cir. 1995))).
294. See generally Robert T. Rhoad & Jason C. Lynch, New Questions Regarding the Jurisdic-
tionality of the FCA’s Public Disclosure Bar: Potential Hurdles and Increased Costs in Defending Against
Parasitic Qui Tam Actions, 55 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 92, Mar. 27, 2013, at 1, 3 (stating that “the
very nature of the bar may have changed such that it no longer concerns a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction” and that this change “would drastically change the way in which it is litigated”).
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case in which the information provided was undisclosed.295 In yet another
example of ironic incoherence, the determination of the award according
to the statute depends upon the court’s determination of whether the infor-
mation was primarily based on disclosed material,296 but the ultimate deter-
mination has been transferred to the executive.297 This presents an addi-
tional separation of powers problem.
Lastly, there are presently nearly one hundred federal whistleblower and
whistleblower retaliation statutes298 entitling a private citizen who provides
information disclosing fraud to some reward.299 Why do these statutes re-
quire more from whistleblowers than the amended FCA does of its relators?
On what grounds will their public service be questioned in the future if the
FCA is any indication of future congressional action vis-à-vis qui tam suits?300
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the intentions were behind the 2010 amendments to the False
Claims Act, their supporters have compromised the position of qui tam re-
lators. Those amendments have not only changed the nature of the action
from an informer’s suit to a “repeaters” suit, but have also reawakened a pan-
oply of problems: constitutional—justiciability, separation of powers, due
process, and equal protection; existential—citizen suits and private bills; and
practical—procedural, ethical, and statutory coherence. With the addition of
a four-word government veto to the bar, the drafters initiated this dilemma.
Only by repeal of those words can the damage be undone.
295. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d); Harmon, supra note 14, at 22.
296. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
297. This effectively gives the DoJ the unilateral power to veto a public disclosure defense.
Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis added) (stating that “[t]he court shall dismiss an action or claim
under this section, unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same allegations or trans-
actions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed”).
298. See Federal Whistleblower Laws, TATE & RENNER ATT’YS AT LAW, http://www.taterenner.
com/fedchart.php.
299. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2006).
300. For a discussion on the “back and forth” between Congress and the judiciary, see supra
notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
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